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CLEANING UP THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MESS

Tom Stacy*

ABSTRACT

This article criticizes the Court's interpretation ofthe Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause and offers its own understanding. The Court's
jurisprudence is plagued by deep inconsistencies concerning the Amendment's text,
the Court's own role, and a constitutional requirement of proportionate punishment.
In search of ways to redress these fundamental shortcomings, the article explores
three alternative interpretations of the Clause: (1) a textualist approach; (2) Justice
Scalia's understanding that the Clause forbids only punishments unacceptable for all
offenses; and (3) a majoritarian approach that would consistently define cruel and
unusual punishment in terms of legislative judgments and penal custom. As evidenced
by the state constitutions they wrote, the Founders used the phrases "cruel and unusual," "cruel or unusual," and "cruel" interchangeably as referring to a unitary concept. An inflexible textual requirement that an unconstitutional punishment be both
cruel andunusual would make little sense as a matter of either interpretation or principle. Contrary to Justice Scalia's view, historical evidence ranging from the English
Bill of Rights to the first federal criminal code reveals that the Framers endorsed
proportionality on both subconstitutional and constitutional levels. A majoritarian
approach does little to cabin judicial subjectivity relative to alternatives. While
overlooking the potential deficiencies of political processes, it gives their results the
force of constitutional law. Such processes can result in problems of undue generality, excessive pursuit of deterrence and incapacitation, inadequate funding, and
desuetude. The gratuitously harsh punishments they sometimes produce merit
judicial attention.
This article proposes a theory of the Eighth Amendment organized around the
notion of cruelty. Contrary to the Court's view, which holds that punishment may
be supported solely by the utilitarian objectives of deterrence and incapacitation, the
article maintains that punishment must be reasonably believed to be consistent with
giving the offender her just deserts. It proposes that the term "unusual" play an evidentiary rather than a definitional role and argues for a more nuanced assessment of
legislative judgments and majoritarian practice. The article explores how this theory
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law; Chair of Recodification
Subcommittee of the Kansas Recodification, Rehabilitation, and Restoration Project
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would apply to several issues, including the abolition of the insanity defense, the use
of strict liability, and Roper v. Simmons's ban against the execution of juveniles
younger than eighteen.
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INTRODUCTION

The Court's jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause stands in disarray.' Public attention has focused on the Justices'
debates over whether a societal consensus against certain applications of the death
penalty may be inferred from international authority or from the States that prohibit

1 The Court itself has recognized the messy state of at least some aspects of its Eighth
Amendmentjurisprudence. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,72 (2003) (describing
the case law governing, the constitutionality of sentences of imprisonment as creating a
"thicket" and as exhibiting "a lack of clarity"); see also Margaret Raymond, "No Fellow in
AmericanLegislation": Weems v. United States andtheApplication ofthe Crueland Unusual
PunishmentClause to PrisonSentences 1-2 & n.4 (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper
04-05, Dec. 2004), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstractid=634261
(noting that the Justices consistently have disparaged the coherence of the Court's Eighth
Amendment cases). Scholars, too, have railed against the confused state of the Court'sjurisprudence. Id.at 2 (describing the Court's cases regarding proportionality ofprison sentences
as "unclear, inconsistent, and unsatisfactory"); Steven Grossman, Proportionalityin NonCapitalSentencing: The Supreme Court'sTorturedApproachto Crueland UnusualPunishment,
84 KY.L.J. 107, 107 (1995) ("[T]he state of the law with respect to proportionality in sentencing
is confused.").
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the death penalty altogether. 2 These are surface disputes. On a number of dimensions far more central to the Clause's core meaning, the Court's work fails to satisfy
minimal demands of doctrinal coherence. One would be hard pressed to identify
any other area of constitutional law plagued by such confusion at its very roots.
The incoherence starts with a disjunction between the Court's decisions and the
Eighth Amendment's text.' The Court has defined "cruel" punishment as involving
"the gratuitous infliction of suffering." Yet none of the punishments it has invalidated qualifies as "cruel" on its own definition.' The Court also has read the Eighth
Amendment both as validating some extremely harsh punishments that are undeniably
"unusual" 6 and as invalidating common prison conditions Many- of the Court's
2

Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and O'Connor have taken the

position that international authority has some relevance, but Justices Scalia and Thomas
disagree, as did the late Chief Justice Rehnquist. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1198-1200 (2005) (international authorities relevant), id.at 1215-16 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (same), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (same), with
Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (international authorities irrelevant),
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (same).
A colloquy between Justices Breyer and Scalia on this issue at American University on
January 13,2005, attracted much media coverage. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, High CourtJustices
Hold Rare Public Debate, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 2005, at 3A. The public prominence of
the issue is such that political conservatives in Congress have introduced the Constitution
Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004), which provides: "[A] court of the
United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order,

directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international
organization or agency, other than the constitutional law and English common law." Id.§ 201.
The Justices also have disagreed about whether a consensus against particular
applications of the death penalty may, in part, be inferred from states whose laws do not
authorize death in any circumstances. CompareRoper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (counting nondeath penalty states in assessing whether there is a societal consensus against particular
applications ofthe death penalty), andAtkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15 (same), with Simmons, 125
S. Ct. at 1218-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that counting non-death penalty states "is
rather like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car").
' "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,5 (1992) (upholding the rule that "'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.., constitutes cruel and unusual punishment"' (omission in original) (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
5 See infra Part I.A. 1.
6 For instance, the Court upheld a Michigan sentence of life imprisonment without
parole for a first time offense of possession of cocaine, even though "[n]o other jurisdiction"
had provided punishment "nearly as severe." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1026
(1991) (White, J., dissenting). For other examples, see infra Part I.A.2.
7 See infra Part I.A.2.
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decisions, then, cannot be squared with even its own explanation of the meaning of
key Eighth Amendment terms.
The Court's opinions also fail to reflect a coherent conception of its own role
relative to other governmental actors. It has repeatedly declared that prevailing
8
punishment practices largely define the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.
This deference to majoritarian judgments, which gives rise to the Justices' publicized jurisdiction-counting debates,9 conflicts with the independent role the Court
has assumed in interpreting other countermajoritarian constitutional rights. Furthermore, the Court has employed such deference selectively and without acknowledging that it is doing so, much less justifying the selectivity. °
Finally, the Court's cases exhibit schizophrenia on whether the Clause embraces
a principle of proportionality, even though it is hard to imagine a question more
central to the Clause's meaning. Proportionality lies at the very heart of the Court's
death penalty jurisprudence, as illustrated by this past Term's decision in Roper v.
Simmons banning the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds." Yet recent
decisions respecting sentences of imprisonment treat proportionality as a purely
12
theoretical requirement stripped of enforceable content.
This article takes a step toward a reformed understanding ofthe Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. It both chronicles the dizzying inconsistencies that inhere in the
Court's cases and outlines an alternative vision. The approach offered here is not
strictly textualist, nor does it conform with Justice Scalia's purportedly originalist view.
It nonetheless is more compatible with the text and original meaning and better harmonizes with the Court's established role in interpreting constitutional civil liberties.
s See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 2.
See infra Part I.B. 1.

1o

" 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). In its death penalty cases, the Court has pursued proportionality by requiring that the death penalty be imposed only for murders accompanied by
a legislatively articulated aggravating circumstance, by mandating that sentencers be free to
consider all relevant mitigating circumstances, and by precluding use of the death penalty
for certain offenses and offenders. See infra Part I.C. 1.
2 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If
Andrade's sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning."); see also
Richard S.Frase, ExcessivePrisonSentences,PunishmentGoals, andtheEighthAmendment:
"Proportionality"Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 574 (2005) ("[I]t remains very
unclear when the Court will find a prison sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate, and on
what precise grounds."); Pamela S. Karlan, "Prickingthe Lines ": The Due Process Clause,
PunitiveDamages,and CriminalPunishment,88 MINN. L. REV. 880,920 (2004) (concluding
that the Court has "largely abandoned a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement of
proportionality under the Eighth Amendment in criminal cases"); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note,
The Supreme Court'sBackwardsProportionalityJurisprudence:ComparingJudicialReview
ofExcessive CriminalPunishmentsandExcessivePunitiveDamagesAwards, 86 VA. L. REV.
1249, 1272 (2000) ("The prospects that defendants can make successful proportionality
challenges to criminal punishments are bleak.").

20051

CLEANING UP THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MESS

In brief, the understanding proposed here assigns a central role to cruelty. In
support of this understanding, this article sheds light on some hitherto unnoticed
historical evidence. The state constitutions enacted while ratification of the Eighth
Amendment was pending simply prohibited "cruel punishments."' 3 Tellingly, there
is no evidence that this formulation was thought to carry a meaning different from
that of Eighth Amendment or from the phrase "cruel or unusual" found in many
state constitutions enacted during the Revolutionary Period. 4 These various
formulations evidently were understood as referring to a unitary concept. It makes
sense to organize this concept around cruelty, which is the term common to all three
formulations. This article also argues that contemporary notions of justice support
organizing our understanding of the Eighth Amendment around the term "cruel."
The proposal here accepts the Court's view that "cruel" punishment entails the
gratuitous infliction of suffering. However, it diverges from the Court's recent
decisions by refusing to give states carte blanche over the reasons that may justify
the infliction of suffering. It instead reads the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
as imposing retributive limits, rooted in nonutilitarian respect for individual worth,
on the extent to which states may pursue utilitarian goals such as deterrence and
incapacitation. It shares many of the same premises as the subconstitutional sentencing philosophy of "limiting retributivism," which has been adopted as the basis for
the redraft of the Model Penal Code's sentencing provisions and for some state guideline systems. 5 In light of the reasons to treat the outcomes of political processes
with care and some skepticism, the interpretation proposed here assigns the term
"unusual" an evidentiary rather than a definitional role. A punishment's conformity
with or departure from prevailing practice can provide useful evidence concerning
whether, leaving adequate space for federalism and separation of powers concerns,
the punishment is "cruel" in the required sense.
In Part I, this article describes the current disorder in the Court's jurisprudence.
The problem is not so much with the results of particular cases as it is with the
absence of any coherent structure and conception that can inform those results. Part
II identifies, considers, and rejects a number of ways in which the Court might make
its understanding more coherent. These include Justice Scalia's alleged originalism,
a "literal meaning" approach, and a majoritarian approach placing consistent reliance upon prevailing punishment practices. Part III urges adoption of an alternative
understanding, outlines its general characteristics, and applies it to a number of
issues such as the elimination of the insanity defense, the use of strict liability, and
the death penalty for juveniles.

'"

See infra Part I.C.1.

14 See

infra Part II.A.

§ 1.02 & cmts. a-f (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); see also
Richard S. Frase, LimitingRetributivism, in THE FUrURE OF IMPIsoNMENT 83,84 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2004) (claiming that "some sort of limiting retributive (LR) theory is already the
consensus model"); Grossman, supra note 1, at 168-71.
15

MODEL PENAL CODE
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I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MESS
The Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence needs rethinking. It would be
unreasonable to expect perfect coherence among the Court's decisions. However,
one can legitimately expect the Court to articulate some plausible view of the constitutional text and to explain how its decisions conform to that text or to justify why
they do not do so. It is also reasonable to want the Court's decisions to reflect, if not
affirmatively express, a more or less coherent understanding of the Court's own
interpretive role relative to other governmental institutions. Finally, while allowing
for the inevitable untidiness of decisions made by different Courts in different eras,
one can reasonably expect important lines of decisions to have roughly consistent
underpinnings. Unfortunately, the Court's work falls considerably short of satisfying any of these rudimentary demands.
A. The Text
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."' 6 Although
the Court has said that it interprets these words "'in a flexible and dynamic
manner,"".' 7 flexibility does not render the text irrelevant. The Court still must
explain the meaning of this phrase and how its decisions may be understood as
flowing from at least a "flexible" interpretation of it. The Court, however, has
embraced a highly restrictive definition of "cruel" that permits even the Founders'
examples of unconstitutional punishments. It has invoked that definition to uphold
some unusual punishments while ignoring it altogether in cases invalidating punishments. The Court also has employed the term "unusual" arbitrarily, treating it as an
invariable requirement in some cases and interpreting the Eighth Amendment to
outlaw common prison conditions in others. It is difficult to identify any other area
of constitutional law in which the Court's use of the text has been as uneven,
inconsistent, and unexplained."

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
'7 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion)). As Justice Brennan conceded in Furman v. Georgia,
the "Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause simply by parsing its
words." 408 U.S. 238, 277 n.20 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
"8 For example, although the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment contrary to
its literal text, it at least has acknowledged and offered justification for doing so. Tenn.
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996).
16
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1. "Cruel"
A "cruel" punishment is a harsh punishment, one that inflicts suffering.' But
harshness is a necessary, not a sufficient condition. Otherwise, virtually all punishments would be "cruel" simply because they impose unwelcome hardships. The
Court has avoided this anomalous result by appealing to the idea of unnecessary
suffering. A "cruel" punishment, it has declared, is one "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering."2'
Although this formulation focuses on punishment's objective effects, the Court
has also required that the punisher bear some measure of culpability respecting
punishment's lack of redeeming value. The degree of culpability, it has said, varies
according to the strength of the governmental interest at stake.2' In some of its prison
condition cases, it has required that the punisher act with "deliberate indifference," a
subjective measure of culpability that is close if not identical to recklessness.22 In
Ewing v. California,3 the Justices, without discussion, embraced an objective standard
of reasonableness. There the Court upheld an extreme application of California's
"three strikes" law.24 Responding to Ewing's contention that the three strikes law did
not promote its avowed goals, the majority opinion declared: "We do not sit as a
'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices. It is enough that the State of
California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences
for habitual felons 'advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial way."' 25 In short, the Court has defined a "cruel" punishment as one that, first,
does not promote a legitimate penological goal as a matter of objective reality, and
second, is either not believed to have redeeming value by those authorizing or
inflicting the punishment or is recklessly or negligently believed to have such value.
Fundamental features of the Court's case law conflict with the meaning it has
attributed to the term "cruel." All of the punishments the Court has overturned are
supported by arguable penological justification and, given the absence of any

'"
20

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Powell, Stewart, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion). See also

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992);
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); NORVAL MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 61 (1974) ("[A]ny punitive suffering beyond societal need

is, in this context, what defines cruelty.").
2

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The Court has held that more than deliberate indifference is
required to show that a prison guard violates the Eighth Amendment by using excessive
force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-8; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
22

23

538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).

Id. at 30-31.
25 Id. at28 (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,297 n.22 (1983)).
24
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indication that punishers were motivated by pure sadism, are not "cruel" by its own
definition. The dynamic at work is as easy to understand as it is ubiquitous.
By the Court's lights, there is nothing illegitimate about pursuing punishment
for the sake of utilitarian objectives such as deterrence or incapacitation. It has
frequently declared that "the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory.', 2 6 More severe punishment can always be sincerely justified
over less severe punishment on the ground that it carries an added deterrent impact
or provides incapacitation. Added deterrence and incapacitation, in turn, can be
defended as necessary to address the gravity of the offense, compensate for the probability that like offenses escape detection, or reduce the incidence of future harm to
an absolute minimum.27 Relevant empirical evidence rarely is available to undercut
such claims. In light of the methodological difficulties of accounting for all of the
relevant variables, it is even rarer still for such evidence to qualify as conclusive
and to render unreasonable a good faith belief that punishment promotes legitimate
objectives. 28 Consequently, except perhaps in cases involving overt sadism, a punishment can never be "cruel" in the sense required by the Court's explanation of that
term's meaning. As Justice Scalia wrote in Harmelin v. Michigan, "[O]ne can
imagine extreme examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept.
But for the same reason these examples are easy to decide, they are certain never to
29

occur."

Consider the Court's landmark 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,0 which
effectively invalidated all death penalty statutes then in force. A majority of the
Justices did not strike down the death penalty per se. Three concurring Justices
instead concluded that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional because it gave juries
unfettered sentencing discretion and because death sentences were arbitrarily and
infrequently imposed. 3 As a matter of objective reality, it could not be said in 1972
Id. at 25 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991)) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also id.
at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that proportionality "takes into account all of the justifications for penal sanctions");
Frase, supra note 12, at 573, 645.
27 See Karlan, supranote 12, at 895.
28 The literature on whether the death penalty deters homicide is notorious in this regard.
See infra note 32. For an interesting recent effort to address whether marginal changes in
legal rules and sentences deter generally, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does
CriminalLaw Deter?A BehaviouralScience Investigation,24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173
(2004). In concluding that criminal law generally does not deter, the authors reject or
discount numerous studies finding to the contrary. Id.
29 501 U.S. at 985-86 (plurality opinion).
30 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31 Id.at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."); id.
at 309 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("These death
26
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and cannot be said now that the death penalty, even if infrequently and haphazardly
imposed, promotes no legitimate penological objective. At a minimum, it incapacitates those subject to it better than does a sentence of imprisonment by lessening the

dangers that the offender will commit serious crime while imprisoned or after escape
or release. An infrequently-applied death penalty also might promote the utilitarian
goal of general deterrence, depending on one's view of the complex mass of empirical studies in effect then and now.32

sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual."); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis for

distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.").
32 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that
determination of the death penalty's deterrent impact "properly rests with the legislatures").

For studies claiming that the death penalty deters, see George A. Chressanthis, Capital
Punishmentand the DeterrentEffect Revisited: Recent Time-Series EconometricEvidence,
18 J. BEHAV. ECON. 81 (1989); Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd,
Does CapitalPunishment Have a DeterrentEffect? New Evidencefrom Postmoratorium
PanelData, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 344 (2003); Isaac Ehrlich, CapitalPunishment and
Deterrence:Some FurtherThoughts andAdditionalEvidence, 85 J. POL. ECoN. 741 (1977);
Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:A QuestionofLife andDeath,65
AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity Analysis of the
DeterrenceHypothesis. Let's Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 42 J.L. & ECON. 455 (1999);
Stephen K. Layson, HomicideandDeterrence:A Reexamination of the UnitedStates TimeSeries Evidence, 52 S.EcoN. J. 68 (1985); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting off
Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment,46 J.L.
& ECON. 453 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders ofPassion,Execution Delays, andthe
Deterrence of CapitalPunishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004).

For studies that find no deterrent impact based on either new data or a reexamination of
the data used in the research cited above, see Craig J. Albert, ChallengingDeterrence:New
Insights on CapitalPunishmentDerivedfrom Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 321 (1999);
William C. Bailey, Deterrence,Brutalizationandthe Death Penalty. Another Examination
of Oklahoma'sReturn to CapitalPunishment,36 CRIMINOLOGY 711 (1998); Richard Berk,
New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Deja Vu All Over Again?, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303 (2005); William J. Bowers & Glen L. Pierce, The Illusion of
Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on CapitalPunishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975);
Samuel Cameron, A Review of the Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Capital
Punishment,23 J. SOCIO-ECON. 197 (1994); John K. Cochran, Mitchell B. Chamlin & Mark
Seth, Deterrenceor Brutalization?An ImpactAssessment ofOklahoma'sReturn to Capital
Punishment,32 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1994); Jeffrey Grogger, The DeterrentEffect of Capital
Punishment: An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N. 295 (1990);
Stephen A. Hoenack & William C. Weiler, A StructuralModel ofMurderBehavior andthe
CriminalJustice System, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 327 (1980); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor,
The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 445 (1977);
James A. Yunker, A New StatisticalAnalysisof CapitalPunishmentIncorporatingU.S. Postmoratorium Data, 82 Soc. ScI. Q. 297 (2001).
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The death penalty also can be said to further the legitimate retributivist objective
of giving offenders their just deserts. Retributivism, which is used here not in the
sense of passionate vengeance but rather as a label for the nonutilitarian theory of
criminal justice in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, insists that punishment be proportionate to the offense.33 Murder, the offense that triggered the possibility of
death under the Georgia statute at issue in Furman, is arguably different in kind
from other offenses because it intentionally and permanently ends the victim's life
and autonomy. Death, a punishment that differs in kind, may be said to be the most
proportionate punishment for intentional murder, or at least the most culpable instances of it. 4 This conclusion is not undermined by infrequent imposition of the
death penalty. At least in one reasonable view, an offender generally does not cease
to receive her just deserts simply because another escapes punishment.35 Even
assuming that the best view is that the death penalty of the kind addressed in
Furman furthers no legitimate penological objective, a contrary conclusion is neither
reckless nor negligent.
A similar analysis applies to the Court's decisions invalidating punishments
other than death. In Hope v. Pelzer,36 the most recent such case, the Court held that
Alabama prison officials had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by handcuffing
an inmate to a hitching post for seven hours.37 Larry Hope, the inmate, had slept on
the bus on the way to his work assignment, had not responded promptly to a prison
guard's order to get off the bus, and, after an exchange of vulgarities, had physically
31 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHiILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE 75-82, 109-30 (rev. ed. 1990). The basic idea is that each individual

possesses an inviolable dignity flowing from her rational autonomy. When an offender egregiously invades another's autonomy,justice requires that the offender suffer criminal punishment
that is proportionate to the wrong. The gravity of the wrong, and hence the degree of required
punishment, depends on the extent to which the wrong has deprived or threatened to deprive
another of her autonomy and the degree of the offender's culpability. Id.
34 See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (describing retribution as the
"primary justification for the death penalty"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion)
("[W]hen a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the
most extreme of crimes."); Russell L. Christopher, DeterringRetributivism: The Injustice
of "Just"Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 851 (2002).
a" Ernest van den Haag, The UltimatePunishment:A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662,
1663 (1986) (making the case that "justice is independent of distributional inequalities.").
Of course, equality is an essential component of any acceptable theory of justice, whether
retributive or utilitarian. Inequalities in the implementation of the death penalty may become
so extreme that they render the penalty unacceptable as a matter of retributive justice. See
generally William S. Laufer & Nien-he Hsieh, ChoosingEqual Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 343 (2003). The constitutional home for addressing such extreme inequalities would seem
to be the Equal Protection Clause, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
36 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
37 Id.
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fought the guard.3 8 While handcuffed to the post, Hope's exposed torso became sunburned, he was given water only once or twice, and he was denied bathroom breaks.39
According to the Court, this treatment amounted to "the gratuitous infliction of

'wanton and unnecessary' pain" and constituted an "obvious" Eighth Amendment
violation.4"
It is not difficult to identify legitimate penological justification for Hope's punishment. The punishment's immediacy, conspicuousness, and painful nature quite conceivably could help deter violation of prison rules. By committing their offenses,
Hope and other inmates had proven relatively impervious to more standard methods
of punishment, such as the threat of confinement. Further, Hope's defiance of prison
authority was physical as well as verbal, thereby heightening its seriousness and the
need for effective deterrence. Even if this analysis is wrong, it contradicts no sound
empirical evidence. Prison officials would not be culpably wrong to believe that
Hope's punishment would deter and therefore was not "gratuitous."'
38

Id. at 734.
Id. at 734-35.

40

Id. at 738.

This same analysis can be applied to any other punishment the Court has invalidated.
Consider Weems v. UnitedStates, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court's first decision invalidating
a punishment as cruel and unusual. Weems, an United States Coast Guard disbursement
officer stationed in the Phillipines, had falsely indicated his payment of wages to Light
House Service employees. Id. at 357-58. He was convicted of falsifying a public document
under the criminal code applicable in the Phillipines, then a United States territory. Id. His
sentence consisted of the punishment of cardena temporal and a fine. Id. at 358. Cardena
temporal, a punishment drawn from the Penal Code of Spain, entailed imprisonment for
fifteen years at "hard and painful labor" with a chain hanging from wrist to ankle. Id. at 364.
It also withdrew rights to property and parenthood for the term of imprisonment and
permanently barred voting and the holding of any public office. Id. at 364-65. After a
lengthy discussion of the Eighth Amendment's background, the Court invalidated the punishment on account of both its "degree and kind." Id. at 377. The punishment was "cruel," the
Court reasoned, in "its excess" in relation both to punishments for similar offenses and to the
penological objectives ofjustice, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Id.
Contrary to this holding's import, the harshness of Weems's punishment was colorably
supported by legitimate penological objectives. In the interests of deterrence, a relatively
severe punishment can be seen as necessary to compensate for the frequency with which the
perpetration offalsity on government bureaucracies goes undetected and unpunished. In fact,
the absence of extremely severe punishment could conceivably give risk-neutral offenders
an affirmative incentive to falsify, depending on the probability ofnondetection and the prospect of gain. It is reasonable to suppose that added increments of severity increased deterrence. Particularly in 1910, no empirical evidence contradicted such a supposition, which
would be quite sensible with respect to offenders such as Weems. Those who hold positions
of public responsibility and who commit their offenses for financial gain are more likely to
be knowledgeable about the rules governing their conduct and to engage in rough cost-benefit
calculations that take into account the amount of potential punishment. In light of these considerations, Weems's punishment was not "cruel" in the sense that those who authorized or inflicted it either believed that it had no legitimate penological justification or were culpably
41

wrong in believing that it did.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:475

Not even the punishments the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause historically
has been thought to condemn can be said to be "cruel," as the Court has defined that
term. The severe pain resulting from the rack and torture can be justified as having
a deterrent impact. Even small gains in deterrence can be defended as necessary to
prevent serious harms such as murder or to compensate for the low detection rate of,
say, terrorism offenses. Such claims cannot be dismissed as facially absurd. Foreign
nations such as Saudi Arabia defend extreme punishments such as amputation on
precisely this ground.42 They can and do cite relatively low crime rates as colorable
support. 43 A claim that torture or other extreme punishments deter might be in error,
but not culpably so." What the Court has said about the meaning of the term "cruel"
thus cannot explain paradigmatic Eighth Amendment violations. Nor does it square
with the results of its own cases.
2. "Unusual"
An "unusual" punishment is one that is out of the ordinary, one that is not
regularly employed.45 Not surprisingly, a punishment's conformity with or departure
from prevailing practice has come to play a leading role in the Court's decisions,
which often revolve around the kind of jurisdiction counts found in an "Am. Jur."
annotation. 46 Virtually no punishments are "cruel" under the Court's definition. The
Court thus may invalidate a punishment only by, first, characterizing it as "unusual"
and, second, effectively defining the Eighth Amendment's meaning in terms of that
42

See ERIKA FAIRCHILD & HARRY R. DAMMER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEMS 38 (2d ed. 2001).
43 Id.
44 Cf ALANM. DERSHOWrrz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 141-58 (2002) (arguing in favor
of torture in limited circumstances). Professor Dershowitz's proposal has attracted serious
commentary and has not been dismissed as absurd on its face or recklessly wrong. See infra

note 160.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (stating that the term had not
generally been given separate significance from the term "cruel"). Of course, the text does
not define how "unusual" a punishment must be to qualify as unconstitutional. It does not
4' But see

answer whether a punishment authorized by, say, only three States is "unusual" for purposes

of the Eighth Amendment. Nor does the text specify the time frame to be used as a baseline
for determining whether a punishment is "unusual." It does not address whether a punishment

must be "unusual" in relation to those used in 1791, now, or both. While these ambiguities
remain, the term's basic meaning is straightforward.
46 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200-05 apps. A-D (2005) (countingjurisdictions); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 nn.9-18, 316 n.20 (2002). Interestingly,

the Court has often explained its reliance on prevailing punishment practices not as a matter of
textual fidelity but rather as a limitation on judicial subjectivity. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 378-79 (1989). But see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (describing the text as "[p]art of the rationale" for determining whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual).

2005]

CLEANING UP THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MESS

requirement alone. The Court's cases, however, have been arbitrarily selective in
their use of the term "unusual," permitting some unusual punishments and condemning some common prison conditions.
Ewing v. California47 exemplifies arecent decision upholding an "unusual" punishment.48 Ewing was convicted of grand theft for stealing three golf clubs worth $399
apiece. 49 Based upon that triggering offense and four prior felony property offenses,5"
Ewing was sentenced to 25 years to life under California's "three strikes" law.5' The
Court upheld this harsh sentence even though it was almost without precedent compared to sentences in other jurisdictions. The State of California, other states filing
amicus briefs on California's behalf, and the Solicitor General came up with only three
instances in which prisoners elsewhere had received a similarly harsh sentence in
comparable circumstances.5 In his dissent, Justice Breyer found only one of these
instances truly analogous, conceding "a single instance of a similar sentence imposed
outside the context of California's three strikes law, out of a prison population now
approaching two million individuals. '53 He concluded that "[o]utside the California
three strikes context, Ewing's recidivist sentence is virtually unique in its harshness for
his offense of conviction, and by a considerable degree."
The plurality did not disagree that Ewing's sentence was "unusual," reasoning
instead that Ewing's sentence was not "cruel., 55 It explained that California had "a
reasonable basis for believing '56 that its harsh punishment substantially furthered
5' 7
"the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.
Ewing's punishment was not "cruel" because it was supported by colorable penological justification.
The plurality's explanation does not work. ConsiderAtkinsv. Virginia,58 decided
one term prior to Ewing. There the Court held that execution of mentally retarded
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
" For other examples of "unusual" punishments the Court has upheld, see Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1027 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (upholding mandatory sentence
of life without parole for first-time offense of possessing cocaine even though "no other
jurisdiction provide[d] such a severe, mandatory penalty for possession of this quantity of
drugs"), and Hutto v. Davis,454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding forty-year sentence
for marijuana offenses even though it exceeded the available maximum in more than 40
states).
49 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
'o Id.
at 11. One of these, a robbery, also involved a threat of personal violence. Id. at 19.
47

5'Id.at 30.
52 Id.at 46. (Breyer,
13

J., dissenting).

Id.at 47.

54 Id.

5 Id.
at 30-31 (plurality opinion).
Id.at 28.
7 Id.
at 29.
58 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

56

488
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defendants violated the Eighth Amendment." Yet such a punishment was not
"cruel," as the Ewing plurality defined the term. The Court listed a diminished
capacity "to control impulses" as a key attribute of retardation.60 States have a
reasonable basis for believing that, in appropriate cases, death substantially furthers
the legitimate goal of incapacitating murderers who pose heightened dangers because
of a lack of impulse control resulting from retardation. The reasoning of the Ewing
plurality thus implies that Atkins was wrongly decided, even though Ewing plurality
members Justices Kennedy and O'Connor voted with the Atkins majority. The
constitutionality ofunusual punishments thus cannot turn on whether they are "cruel"
under the Court's definition: none of the punishments it has invalidated qualifies and,
used for purposes of deterrence rather than sadism, neither do torture nor the rack.6
From a textual standpoint, it is inconsistent for the Court to invalidate some "unusual"
punishments that are not "cruel," such as the death penalty for the retarded, but not
others, such as Ewing's uniquely harsh sentence.
If inconsistency between the Court's decisions and the text were confined to cases
upholding unusual punishments, then perhaps it could be laid entirely at the doorstep
of an incomplete or misguided definition of "cruel."6 " But the conflict between the
Court's decisions and the text sweeps more broadly than this. In some contexts, the
Court also has read the Eighth Amendment to invalidate common punishments.63 This
view cannot be reconciled with the literal text, which prohibits punishments that are
cruel "and unusual."
The Court's declarations about prison conditions illustrate the incompatibility.
Prisons are expensive to build and operate. State voters and legislators typically place
a very low priority on their funding.' A harshly anti-crime political environment,
prohibitions against voting on the part of imprisoned felons,65 and state budgetary
59
60

Id.
Id.at 318.

61

See supra Part I.A. 1.

All that it is needed, one could then argue, is a more satisfactory defmition of "cruel"
that would explain when an unusual punishment should be upheld and when it should be
invalidated. Ideally, such a definition would square with the results of the Court's prior
decisions, explaining, for instance, why the Court was right both to uphold the punishment
in Ewing and to invalidate the death penalty for the retarded in Atkins.
63 See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
4 See David E. Pozen, Managinga CorrectionalMarketplace:PrisonPrivatizationin
the United States andthe UnitedKingdom, 19 J.L. & POL.253, 264 (2003); Neal Devins, I
Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1296-97 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M.
62

FEELEY & EDWARD

L. RUBIN,

JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:

How THE

(1998)).
65 See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisementas Punishment:Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895 (1999) (citing Michael A. Fielder, Voting Rights
for Felons Win Support, WASH. POST, Feb. .22, 1999, at A1).
In 46 states and the District of Columbia, felons are prohibited from
COURT REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS
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problems all contribute. The dynamic that underlies the resultant chronic underfunding is not confined to a few states; it is pervasive." No one should be much
surprised, then, that until judicial intervention occurred in the name of the Eighth
Amendment, a great many prisons were extremely unhealthy, overcrowded, and
violent.
Indeed, before such intervention, brutal and unhealthy conditions were pervasive.67
In Rhodes v. Chapman,6" for instance, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion recounted the "gruesome" conditions in Alabama prisons, which included rampant
everyday violence, two hundred inmates sharing a single toilet, and inmates sleeping
on the floor next to urinals.69 Such unsafe conditions, Justice Brennan observed, are
"neither aberrational nor anachronistic. 70
The Court nonetheless has read the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to
render widespread prison conditions unconstitutional. The Court has declared that
the Clause obligates prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement."'"
Under the Court's interpretation, much of the "rampant" prison violence to which
Justice Brennan referred in Rhodes is unconstitutional. Prison officials may not
themselves use "excessive physical force against prisoners"7 2 and also may not be
deliberately indifferent to violence among inmates.73 In Rhodes, Justice Brennan cited
voting while in prison. In addition, 32 states prohibit offenders from
voting while on parole and 29 bar voting while on probation. Felons are
barred for life from voting in 14 states, a prohibition that can be waived
only through a gubernatorial pardon or some other form of clemency.
Only four states - Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Vermont - allow prison inmates to vote.
Id.at 1898. See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (California felon voting

disqualification does not violate equal protection); cf.Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d
1287 (11 th Cir. 2003) (invalidating Florida felon voting disqualification statute), vacated,
377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004). "
66 See, e.g., David McCord, ImaginingaRetributivistAlternativetoCapitalPunishment,50
FLA.L. REv. 1,51 (1998) (mentioning "the chronic underfinding ofcorrectional departments").
67 James E. Robertson, PsychologicalInjury and the PrisonLitigation Reform Act: A
"Not Exactly, "EqualProtectionAnalysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 108-10 (2000) (describing state of prisons prior to federal court intervention).
68
69

452 U.S. 337 (1981).

Id.at 355-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).

70 Id.at 356.

71Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
72 Id.In particular, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits prison officials to
use force .'in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline' but prohibits the use of
force 'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."' Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1973)). In Whitley and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), the Court asserted that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force in prisons without any showing
that such force was unusual.
73Farmer,511 U.S. at 832-33.
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the "'appalling"' and "'blatant[ly] inadequat[e]"' health care provided in the Colorado
State Penitentiary as an example of a common condition.74 Nonetheless, two years
earlier, the Court had held in Estelle v. Gamble" that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause precludes deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs,
thereby in effect requiring that prison officials furnish a decent minimum of health
care.6 The Court has extended this principle beyond health care to any prison condition that implicates health, safety, or "basic human needs"77 such as food, clothing,
and housing.
These various requirements all flow naturally from idealistic precepts of humane
treatment. However, they emphatically do not derive from prison practices or legislative judgments so prevalent that departures from them are "unusual." Not surprisingly, the Court has made no serious effort to so demonstrate.78 Nor could it. In 1980,
74Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 356 (alterations in original) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980)).
75
76

429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 698 (1978)). See also
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (holding that the Clause prohibits "deprivations denying 'the minimal
77

civilized measure of life's necessities'

(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 274, 298

(1991))).

Cf MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RuBiN, JuDIcIAL PoLIcY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 13 (1998) (calling prison
78

reform cases "the most striking example ofjudicial policy making in modem America"). In
Estelle v. Gamble, for instance, the Court declared that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Clause condemns punishments that are either unusual because they "are incompatible with 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' 429 U.S. 97, 102
(1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)), or"which 'involve the unnecessary

and wanton infliction ofpain."' Id at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality opinion)). In support of its view that the Clause prohibits deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs, the Court did point to "modem legislation codifying the common-law
view that 'it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason
of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.' Id at 103--04 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)). While this legislation evidences
theoretical acceptance of some sort of an obligation to provide medical care to prisoners, the
Court made no effort to explore the scope of the obligation legislatively recognized, much less

to show that the standard it announced matched the prevailing view. Id. at 103 n.8 (noting the
existence but not discussing the content of state regulations "which specify, in varying degrees
of detail, the standards of medical care to be provided to prisoners"). Furthermore, the Court's
failure to go beyond legislation to examine actual practice conflicts with its approach in death
penalty cases. In Furman v. Georgia, the plurality concluded that the death penalty was

"unusual" despite its widespread legislative adoption because, as a matter of actual practice, it
was infrequently employed. 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (expressing
concern about the death penalty's "selective or irregular application").
Further, in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), the Court held that an inmate's
exposure to second-hand smoke in his cell may constitute "cruel and unusual punishment,"

provided that on remand the inmate was able to show that, inter alia, such exposure "is
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Justice Brennan reported in Rhodes that prisons or prison systems in twenty-two
states then had been found unconstitutional and placed under federal court orders. 79
This understates matters, as now fully forty-eight American jurisdictions have had
some part of their prison facilities declared in violation of the Constitution."
Conditions that subsist in forty-eightjurisdictions might be abhorrent and inhumane,
but they cannot be "unusual."
3. Relationship Between "Cruel" and "Unusual"
To muddy the Court's approach still further, the Justices have made conflicting
declarations about the relationship between the terms "cruel" and "unusual." The
Justices sometimes have said that an unconstitutional punishment must be both cruel
and unusual, just as the literal text provides."' On other occasions, however, Justices
have questioned "[w]hether the term 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different
from 'cruel."' 82 The relationship between these two terms raises interesting questions
of interpretation, which are the subject of extended discussions in Parts II and III.
The Court has not done the intellectual work needed to resolve these questions, as
the oscillations in its treatment of prevailing penal practice reveal.
B. The Court'sRole
In addition to disconnection with the constitutional text, the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence suffers from inconsistency concerning its own role.
According to the standard exposition found in the Court's opinions, the official
judgments of other institutions define the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court has said, derives its meaning
from the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
'4
society." 3 These standards, in turn, are defined "to the maximum possible extent"
contrary to current standards of decency," id. at 35, because it is "not [a risk] that today's
at 36. If the Court had been serious about requiring that such
society chooses to tolerate." Id.
punishments were "unusual," it would have focused on prevailing prison practices rather than
general societal attitudes respecting second-hand smoke. A prison condition does not constitute "unusual"punishmentbecause it departs from the nonpunitive conditions that prevail
in society. It is so only because it departs from conditions prevailing in prison.
9 452 U.S. at 353 n.1.
80 FEELEY & RuBIN, supra note 78, at 39-42.
81 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) ("Severe, mandatory penalties
").
may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense ....
12 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion). See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 377
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("There was no discussion of the interrelationship of the terms
'cruel' and 'unusual,' and there is nothing in the debates supporting the inference that the
Founding Fathers would have been receptive to torturous or excessively cruel punishments
even if usual in character or authorized by law.").
83 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002);
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by objective standards such as "statutes passed by society's elected representatives." 5 Although some of its opinions declare that prevailing practice does not
"wholly determine" 6 the matter and that the Clause's meaning ultimately hinges on
the Court's "own judgment,,1 7 the Court has never invalidated punishment it has
characterized as consonant with prevailing practice.8" Even theoretical authority to
depart from prevailing practice is controversial, prompting Justice Scalia to complain
in Atkins v. Virginia that "[t]he arrogance of this assumption of power takes one's
breath away."89
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8(1992); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 (1989).
' Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). See also Harnelin,
501 U.S. at 1000 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion).
85 Stanford,492 U.S. at 370. The reliance on prevailing practice traces back to the Court's
earliest Eighth Amendment decisions. In its very first case addressing the meaning of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, decided in 1866, the Court addressed a contention that it
was unconstitutional to impose a fine and thirty days imprisonment at hard labor for selling
liquor without a license. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866). In
Pervear,the Court declared that this punishment could not be cruel and unusual because it
was "the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States." Id.at 480. The Court's
conclusion that the punishment did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment was arguably
dictum. It was made unnecessary by the Court's alternative holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply at all because it constrained the actions of the federal government, not
state governments. Id.at 479-80; see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447-49 (1890)
(declining to discuss the merits of an Eighth Amendment challenge because the Amendment
did not apply to the States).
In its next nineteenth century Eighth Amendment decision, Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court
rejected a challenge to death by firing squad. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Again appealing to prevailing practices, the Court canvassed treatises on military law. Id.at 134-35. It reasoned
that a showing that shooting was a customary mode of execution in military cases was "quite
sufficient" to undermine the Eighth Amendment challenge. Id.See also Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (interpreting a California statute to criminalize the status ofnarcotics
addiction and declaring that "[i]t is unlikely that any State at this moment in history" would
criminalize other such conditions, such as mental illness or venereal disease); Trop, 356 U.S.
at 100 n.32, 102-03 (plurality opinion) (citing congressional practice and international custom);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (comparing punishment with others for
similar and more serious offenses both within and without the jurisdiction).
86 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
87 Id. See also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190-91 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
312; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion). But see Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78
("emphatically reject[ing]" suggestion that the Court's own judgment has any relevance).
88 In Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192-94, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13, Enmundv. Florida,458
U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982), and Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-96 (plurality opinion), the Court
declared that the constitutionality of the punishment was ultimately for it to decide. In each
case, however, the Court found its own judgment and prevailing practice to be in accord.
89 536 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1217 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (disdaining the belief "that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the sub-
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This deference to other institutions produces incoherence both within and
without the Court's Eighth Amendment case law. First, as discussed in the preceding section, the Court's reliance on prevailing practice has not been uniform
within the Eighth Amendment context. Second, the Court's professed willingness
to define the very meaning of cruel and unusual punishment in terms of prevailing
practice runs contrary to the independent role it regularly assumes in interpreting
other countermajoritarian rights.
1. Internal-Consistency
In the main, the reasoning and results of theCourt's casescan be seen to accord
with its professed reliance on customary punishment practices.90 When the Justices
have disagreed about the result in a particular case, both the majority and the dissent
generally purport to follow the dictates of customary practice and ostensibly rest
their disagreement largely on custom's proper characterization. 9
Still, the Court's decisions nonetheless fall considerably short of consistent
adherence to prevailing practice. In its prison condition cases, the Court has read the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to invalidate conditions that are neither "aberjective views of five Members of this Court").
90 The Court has upheld punishments based upon a conclusion that they do not sharply
depart from prevailing practice. Punishments in this category include the death penalty statutes
enacted in the aftermath of Furman, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (plurality opinion), the

execution ofjuveniles who were sixteen or older at the time of their offense, Stanford,492
U.S. at 372 (noting that only fifteen of the thirty-six death penalty states (42 percent) prohibited death for such offenders), overruledby Roper, 125 S.Ct. 1183, and the death penalty
for felony murderers who act with reckless indifference to life, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 154 (1987) (noting that only eleven ofthe thirty-seven death penalty states (30 percent)
prohibited such punishment).
The Court also has invalidated numerous punishments based on a conclusion that they
do defy customary practice. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (death for juveniles younger
than eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (death penalty for the retarded);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (observing that "[t]his ancestral legacy has
not outlived its time," since not a single state authorized the death penalty for the insane);

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,300 (1983) (noting that the offender "was treated more severely
than he would have been in any other State") (life sentence without parole for relatively
minor property offenses); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789 (death penalty for mere participation in
a robbery in which an accomplice took a life not permitted in twenty-eight of.the death
penalty states (78 percent)); Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (plurality opinion) (asserting that
only one jurisdiction, Georgia, authorized the death penalty for rapists of adult victims);

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-301 (-1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory
death sentences for first-degree murder); Weems, 217 U.S. at 377 (declaring that lengthy
prison sentence at hard labor for cheating the government out of pay had "no fellow in
American legislation").
"' For an account of the legerdemain in which the Justices engage to characterize prevailing practice in a way that befits their desired result, see infrd Part II.C. 1.
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' In addition, the Court
rational nor anachronistic."92
has upheld some punishments
that do conflict with prevailing punishment practice, such as mandatory life imprisonment for possession of cocaine 93 and Ewing's lengthy sentence under California's
three-strikes law. 9'
There is nothing objectionable in principle about general deference to prevailing
practice coupled with occasional exceptions. However, the Court's opinions do not
explain why and when such exceptions are warranted. In its prison conditions cases,
the Court has yet to acknowledge, much less justify, the discontinuity between its
proclamations about the definitional role of custom and actual prison practices. Nor
has the Court offered a satisfactory explanation of why officials may employ punishments that are harsher than those within the range of prevailing custom. Except
respecting rare instances of sadism, the explanation offered by Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Ewing v. California95 always applies.
The Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishment cases, then, appear internally inconsistent. Given the absence ofanypersuasive explanation, the Court's departures from
custom have the appearance of inconsistent and result-oriented anomalies. They
further raise a suspicion that the Court lacks a coherent understanding of custom's
proper role and, by implication, of the Court's own role relative to the political actors
who create custom.

2. External Inconsistency
The Court's decisions also suffer from external inconsistency respecting its own
role relative to other governmental actors. Its avowed deference to penal custom
conflicts with the independent judgment it has exercised in interpreting other individual rights.
The Court has not defined the right to equal protection with reference to
customary practice. If the Court had relied on prevailing practice in the equal
protection context, it could not have issued its landmark decision in Brown v. Board
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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring injudgrnent).

93 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).
94 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-29 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding forty-year sentence for possession and
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana in the face of evidence that the average sentence in
this state for marijuana offenses was three years and the maximum in any other case was
fifteen years); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life sentence for minor
property recidivist when such a sentence was theoretically possible in only two other states).
" 538 U.S. at 28 ("We do not sit as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess ... policy
choices. It is enough that the State... has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically
enhanced sentences for habitual felons 'advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system
in any substantial way."' (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297
n.22 (1983))).
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of Education,96 which invalidated racial segregation then widespread in public
schools. Nor could the Court have invalidated gender discrimination to the extent
that it has.97 Indeed, the Court has considered a history of deliberate discrimination
against a particular group as one of the "indicia of suspectness" that warrants
heightened judicial scrutiny.9" This reverses the approach at work in the cruel and
unusual punishment cases, where the historical pedigree and widespread nature of
a particular practice tends to establish its constitutionality rather than raise a suspicion
of unconstitutionality.
The Court also does not rely upon prevailing laws and practices to define the
meaning of free speech. For instance, New York Times Company v. Sullivan" and
its progeny forced very substantial revisions in the law of defamation." ° Familiar
First Amendment doctrines such as the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination
and the distinction between lesser protected commercial speech and filly protected
speech do not derive from majoritarian practices.'' The Court has fashioned these
doctrines not because they are congruent with and legitimize what a supermaj ority
of states already do, but rather because they are thought necessary to vindicate free
speech values.'0 2
In a few of its substantive due process decisions, the Court has used majoritarian practices to define individual rights. According to cases such as Griswoldv.
Connecticut 03and Roe v. Wade, 4 an unenumerated right of privacy or autonomy
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty rooted in the Due Process Clause. In
these two landmark decisions, the Court gave no weight at all to prevailing legislative
practices in defining the scope of constitutionally protected autonomy. In fact, the
Roe Court expressly noted that criminal abortion prohibition it struck down was

96

347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment

and Slavery in the GlobalEconomy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 976 (2002) ("[T]he Brown

Court dramatically rejected custom and tradition.").

97 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating longstanding all-

male education at the Virginia Military Institute).
98 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See also Kimel v.

Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
99 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

100 For examples of subsequent cases limiting established common law principles of defamation, seeDun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality
opinion), and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
' See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (holding that content
discriminationjurisprudence is designed to prevent the government from suppressing certain
ideas, making no mention of majoritarian rule).
102 Id. ("The rationale of the general prohibition... is that content discrimination 'raises
the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.' (citations omitted)).
103 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'04

410U.S. 113 (1973).
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"typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a
century."' 0' 5 However, in some of its decisions, notably Bowers v. Hardwick"° and
Washington v. Glucksberg,l°7 the Court has appealed to majoritarian judgments as
defining the scope of fundamental substantive due process rights. As in the cruel
and unusual punishment cases, the Court has reasoned that laws and practices may
violate the Constitution only when they sharply diverge from society's legal traditions. In Bowers, the Court upheld a criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy,'0 °
and in Glucksberg,it upheld a Washington law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
because those laws did not flout the legal practices of a supermajority of States over
time and, in fact, were consistent with those practices.."
Of course, Lawrence v.
Texas".. overruled Bowers. As the dissenters fumed, the Lawrence Court rejected
the definitional role that both Bowers and Glucksberg had accorded to societal
tradition."' The role of tradition in the Court's substantive due process decisions
remains unsettled.
Even assuming that the tension in the Court's substantive due process decisions
should be resolved in favor of reliance on societal tradition, it does not obviously
follow that the Court should employ the same approach respecting cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court would need to explain why the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, an enumerated right, is more analogous to the unenumerated substantive due
process rights than it is to enumerated rights such as freedom of speech and equal
protection. This the Court has not done.
In its Eighth Amendment decisions, then, the Court has taken a dramatically
different view of its own role relative to majoritarian institutions than in other constitutional contexts. If this apparent extemal incongruity can explained away, the
Court's cases do not indicate how.
C. Proportionality
Internal coherence is lacking in a third fundamental aspect of the Court's work:
its treatment of proportionality. Construed in light of a principle of proportionality,
the Eighth Amendment forbids punishments that are grossly disproportional to the
actual or threatened harm and the offender's culpability. Life imprisonment may be
constitutional for intentional murder but not for a strict liability offense of overtime
'o'Id. at 116.

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
'07 521 U.S. 702 (1997); cf Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-51 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (using tradition to define the contours of procedural due process).
'0s478 U.S. at 191-94.
'0o521 U.S. at 721-28.
"' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
." Id.
at 594-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'06
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parking. The competing view, enthusiastically promoted by Justice Scalia, holds
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only those punishments such as torture that are
"everywhere and always" cruel and unusual no matter what the context.' 2
The Court has embraced a principle of proportionality but has applied it in an
incongruous fashion. In the death penalty context, the Court has pursued proportionality aggressively, using multiple means and prophylactic rules. Indeed, its death
penalty jurisprudence is contradictory and incoherent unless understood against a
background principle of proportionality. In contrast, the Court's recent cases addressing punishments other than death reduce proportionality to a purely theoretical
principle devoid of practical significance.
1. The Death Penalty
Proportionality lies at the very heart of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
Ever since Furman,the Court's death penalty cases have recognized two basic principles. The first requires that legislatures narrow the class eligible to receive death
by specifying aggravating circumstances beyond the elements of murder or firstdegree murder.1 '3 The second principle requires that the sentencer be free to consider any and all relevant mitigating circumstances." 4 Justices and commentators
understandably have questioned whether these principles of guided discretion and

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 987 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring). Under the death penalty statutes in force when Furmanwas decided, all those who
committed broadly defined capital offenses such as murder or first-degree murder were
eligible to receive death. Id. at 248. Within these large categories of eligible offenders, the
statutes gave no meaningful guidance on how to exercise sentencing discretion concerning
the imposition of death. Furmancondemned such statutes on the ground that, as applied, they
resulted in the arbitrary and infrequent selection of offenders to die. Id. at 256-57. The Court
since has adopted the principle of guided discretion. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269,
275 (1998); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 755 (1996); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) (sentencer's discretion must be "directed and limited");
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-71 (1976) (plurality opinion). See generally Scott W.
Howe, The FailedCasefor Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-SentencingTrial,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 808-10 (1998).
"4
The sentencer may be neither precluded from taking mitigating circumstances into
account altogether nor restricted to a specified list of such circumstances. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
112

113
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mercy cohere with one another.' 15 While the principle of guided discretion presupposes that discretion is dangerous, the principle of mercy affirmatively requires it.
Whatever logical tension exists between these two principles can be dispelled
by viewing them as complementary corollaries of a more general proportionality
principle. By narrowing the class of eligible offenders according to specified standards, the principle of guided discretion tends to limit the penalty's imposition to
cases in which the offense is particularly grave or the offender's culpability is particularly great. The mercy principle helps assure "that punishment [is] directly related
to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant" by tending to screen out those
6
having diminished culpability."1
The principles of guided discretion and mercy are indirect ways of assuring
proportionality. Courts could more directly implement proportionality themselves
by engaging in case-by-case oversight, asking whether each death sentence is proportionate in light of that case's particular facts. Many state courts do employ such
oversight as a matter of their own law, comparing each case in which a death
sentence has been issued with other factually similar cases.' 17 The Court has not
chosen this path. It instead has required legislatures to specify aggravating circumstances and defense attorneys to present arguably mitigating evidence to juries.
These requirements give legislatures, defense attorneys, and juries very considerable
leeway in defining the meaning of proportionality. The Court has relied upon these
actors, not its own review or standards of its own creation. Still, the principles of
guided discretion and mercy, in combination, constitute a creative and defensible
means of promoting proportionality. Together, they help assure that imposition of
"' Toward the end of his tenure on the Court, Justice Blackmun concluded that these two
principles of "reasonable consistency" and "individual fairness" cannot both be realized in
practice. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial ofcertiorari). Announcing his judgment that "the death penalty experiment has failed,"
id. at 1145, he concluded that "no sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed," id
at 1146 n.2. Justice Scalia, concurring in the denial of certiorari, agreed with Justice
Blackmun that the two principles of consistency and fairness could not be reconciled. Id. at
1141-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial ofcertiorari). According to Justice Scalia, however,
the better solution is to jettison the principle of fairness. Id. at 1142; see also Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I cannot adhere to a principle
so lacking in support in constitutional text and so plainly unworthy of respect under stare
decisis. Accordingly, I will not, in this case or in the future, vote to uphold an Eighth
Amendment claim that the sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully restricted."); Steven
G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (1992); Mary Sigler,

Contradiction,Coherence,and GuidedDiscretionin the Supreme Court'sCapitalSentencing
Jurisprudence,40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1151 (2003).
116 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
117 Leigh B. Bienen, The ProportionalityReview of Capital Cases by State High Courts
After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130,

222-62 app. A (1996) (listing twenty-three jurisdictions that use proportionality review).
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the death penalty is proportionate to the offense's gravity and the offender's
culpability.
The Court also has implemented proportionality more directly by prohibiting use
of the death penalty for entire categories of offenses and offenders. As for offenders,
the Court has held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits the
execution of the mentally retarded,"' the insane," 9 and juveniles below the age of
eighteen at the time of the offense. 2 ' As for offenses, the Court has held that death
may not constitutionally be imposed for the rape of an adult woman," 2' nor for some
felony murders. 2 2 The Court has explicitly rested all of these holdings on the ground
that the Eighth Amendment forbids grossly disproportionate punishments.
2. Other Punishments
In sharp contrast with its death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has treated
proportionality as essentially lacking enforceable content in its modem cases concerning other punishments. In theory, the Court has embraced an Eighth Amendment principle "prohibit[ing] imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.' ' 123 However, the Court has repeatedly stressed that
this principle is "narrow"' 124 and "forbids only extreme sentences" such as a life
sentence for overtime parking. 2 5 Only once in the last several decades has the Court
invalidated a sentence of imprisonment as grossly disproportionate.'2 6 During that
same period, it has upheld sentences of life imprisonment for three relatively minor
property offenses,' 27 forty years' imprisonment for possession and distribution of

118

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

"1

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-21 (2003) (plurality opinion).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
Compare Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (plurality

120
121
122
123
124

125
126

opinion), Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982)
(per curiam), and Rummel, 445 U.S. 263, with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In
Solem, the Court invalidated a sentence of life without parole imposed under a recidivism
statute. Id. The offense that triggered the sentence was that of uttering a false check for $100.
Id. The Court described all of his six prior offenses as "nonviolent." Id. at 297.
127 Rummel, 445 U.S. 263. Rummel received the life sentence under a recidivism statute
for committing a third offense. Id. at 266. His prior offenses consisted of fraudulent use of
a credit card to obtain $80 in goods and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.
at 265-66. His "triggering" offense consisted of felony theft for obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. Id. at 266.
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nine ounces of marijuana,' mandatory life imprisonment without parole for a first
offense of possession of cocaine,' 29 and twenty-five years to life under California's
"three-strikes" law for a triggering offense of stealing goods worth approximately
$1,200. 130 Even though each of these sentences was "virtually unique"' 3' in its
severity, the Court upheld them through an analysis that made intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional comparisons with other sentences irrelevant.
It is remarkable that the Court reached these results during an era when "both
major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate
the label 'tough on crime.""" As a consequence, criminal penalties have become
harsher, often dramatically so. "The 1980s saw several waves of anti-drug legislation
imposing significant increases in the penalties .... ,,' In the 1990s, legislatures
enacted "more mandatory minimums, three strikes provisions, and extend[ed] the
death penalty to more offenses.' 34 Set against the backdrop of this harshly anticrime political environment, the pattern of the Court's decisions attests to the virtual
irrelevance of proportionality outside of the death penalty context. 31
3. Inconsistency
The Court's "death is different" mantra 36 does not adequately explain its very
aggressive pursuit of proportionality in death penalty cases and its nearly complete
disinterest elsewhere. Neither the Eighth Amendment's text, history, values, nor
early precedent supports a hard and fast distinction between the death penalty and
other punishments. If proportionality is indeed part of the Eighth Amendment's
meaning, then it ought to have discernible content in cases involving both the death
penalty and imprisonment. In fact, the Court first affirmed proportionality in Weems
Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.
130 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-20 (plurality opinion). The defendant's prior "strikes" consisted
of three prior convictions for burglary and one for robbery.
131 Id. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12

129

132

William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsofCriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,

509 (2001). See also MICHAEL

TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY

3-20 (2004); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got To Do With
It? The Political,Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the
Development of (Federal)Criminal Law, 1BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23 (1997).
133 Beale,supranote 132, at 24.
IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE

134

131

Id.
See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) ("[T]he death penalty is the
most severe punishment."); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (discussing the
"unique nature ofthe death penalty"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.").
136
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v. UnitedStates,'.7 which invalidated penalties other than death, including imprisonment. ' Conversely, if proportionality is not properly part of the Eighth Amendment's meaning, then it should not be pursued in any context. This is the position
Justice Scalia articulated on behalf of himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Harmelin v. Michigan.3 9 For these Justices, the death penalty proportionality cases
might deserve to be left intact as a matter of stare decisis but not as matter of
interpretive coherence.
It is true that the death penalty is uniquely harsh and that line-drawing among
sentences of imprisonment can be difficult. However, other than the ultimate finality
of a death sentence, the same factors bear on the gravity of the offense and culpability
of the offender in both death and non-death cases. That death is a qualitatively more
severe punishment can justify applying proportionality somewhat differently in the
contexts of death and imprisonment. But it cannot justify pursuing proportionality
vigorously through multiple means and prophylactic rules in one context and, in
effect, not at all in the other. That it is sometimes or even very often difficult to
draw distinctions between terms of imprisonment hardly implies that it is always
unduly difficult to do so. It would be difficult to draw a constitutional line between
a ten- and a fifteen-year prison sentence. But it does not follow that the difference
between a sentence of life without parole and one of five years imprisonment may
never have constitutional significance.
The incongruity between the Court's treatment of death and other punishments
becomes even more difficult to defend when one considers its reliance on proportionality in other constitutional contexts. Under the mantle of substantive due process,
the Court has claimed authority to invalidate grossly disproportionate civil punitive
damage awards." The Court also has recognized judicial authority to invalidate
grossly disproportionate criminal forfeitures and fines under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.' 4 Like sentences of imprisonment, monetary fines
differ from one another only in degree. It is hard to understand why the problems
of line-drawing and judicial subjectivity preclude distinguishing among sentences
of imprisonment, but not civil or criminal monetary fines." 2
7 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. For a discussion of Weems, see supra note 41.
139 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion). For a critique of the underpinnings of this
position, see infra Part II.B.
,4o See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). But cf Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (rejecting the argument that
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause prohibits grossly disproportionate civil punitive
damage awards).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1998).
142 See infra note 277.
138
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D. Summary
The Court's Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence needs rethinking. Entire lines of
decisions conflict with the text and with the Court's independent interpretive role.
The Court's'decisions are inconsistent with one another on such important dimensions as the text, its role, and the constitutional status of proportionality. For any
provision, it is essential that the Court's work reflect some cohesive and defensible
understanding of the text, its own role relative to other governmental actors, and the
core meaning of the provision in question. The Court's cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence fails each and every one of these tests.
II. ALTERNATIVES

This Part begins to explore remedies for the disorders identified in Part I. It
begins with an approach that would seek to enforce the text's literal meaning. It
next moves to Justice Scalia's allegedly originalist view, which holds that the Eighth
Amendment condemns only universally unacceptable punishments such as torture
and the rack. Finally, it considers an approach that would use prevailing penal practices as the consistent constitutional baseline, prohibiting markedly harsh departures
from it.
A. Textualism

The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not
be] inflicted.'1 3 The most obvious way to interpret this prohibition is to adhere to
its language. Such a textualist approach has strong general appeal. It is, after all,
the text that Congress approved and the state legislatures ratified. Many scholars
and jurists accordingly maintain that a textualist approach maximizes the law's
legitimacy and minimizes judicial subjectivity.44
For a textualist approach to work, it must make sense of the individual terms
found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Part I pointed out some of the
flaws in the Court's use of the terms "cruel" and "unusual," but the more intractable
textualist problem derives from the "and" that conjoins these terms. The text unambiguously requires that prohibited punishments be both cruel and unusual. Applied with
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See, e.g., LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND
'4
CONSTrTUTIONAL THEORY 136-42 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
141

37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States FederalCourts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
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the inflexibility the literal text demands, such a requirement is insupportable both
as a matter of interpretation and principle.
Three considerations make it implausible to interpret the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause literally in this respect. The first is that no reliable evidence
supports a conclusion that the Founders understood the Clause in this way. When the
Eighth Amendment was proposed and ratified, a number of state constitutions had
provisions addressing impermissible punishments. The Delaware, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts provisions prohibited "cruel orunusual" punishments.'4 Like the English Bill of Rights of 1689,' 4 the New York provision forbade
"cruel and unusual" punishments."4 7 Interpreted literally, these provisions embrace
strikingly different prohibitions. A ban against "cruel or unusual" punishments is
dramatically broader. For instance, this ban would outlaw a punishment requiring
that an offender write a letter of apology to the victim. While such a punishment is
by no means "cruel," it would be "unusual." Despite the very significant difference
in the literal language of these two sets of provisions, the available evidence indicates
that the Founders understood them to capture the same meaning. 4 8 If they had
thought otherwise, then one would expect some recorded contemporaneous recognition of the difference's significance in a diary, letter, newspaper, or legislative record.
Evidently there is none.
The history of the English Bill of Rights reinforces the conclusion that the phrases
"cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" were understood to capture the same
meaning. Just months after the House of Lords approved the Bill's prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishments," a group of Lords filed a dissenting statement in
the case of Titus Oates. 49 The dissenting Lords concluded that the punishments
16 (1776), reprintedin 2 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 278 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1980) [hereinafter THE ROOTS]; N.C. DECLARATION
145 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, §

OF RIGHTS, para. X (1776), reprintedin THE RoOTS, supra,at 287; MASS. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, para. XXVI (1780), reprintedin THE ROOTS, supra,at 343; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS,
para. XXXIII (1783), reprintedin THE ROOTS, supra,at 379; see also THE DEBATES INTHE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) (proposal of New York Ratification Convention to amend
the Constitution to prohibit "cruel or unusual" punishments); id. at 335 (proposal of Rhode
Island Ratification Convention to amend the Constitution to prohibit "cruel or unusual"
punishments).
146 See infra Section II.B.l.a; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
147 See N.Y. BLL OF RIGHTS (1787), reprintedin THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 615 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS] (emphasis added).
141 In 1787, New York adopted a Bill of Rights that prohibited infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments." THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 147, at 615. One year

later, the New York Ratifying Convention ratified the Constitution but proposed amending
it to prohibit "cruel or unusual" punishments. Id. at 613. Insofar as the historical record
reflects, no one remarked on the difference.
149

5 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTrruTIoN 369, para. 6 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds.,
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imposed in Oates's case violated the Bill of Rights, which they described as
providing. that neither "cruel nor unusual punishments [be] inflicted."'"5 Their
mistake suggests that they understood prohibitions of "cruel and unusual" and "cruel
or unusual" punishments as equivalents. This history has particular salience because
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was taken virtually verbatim from the
English Bill of Rights and because the English Bill of Rights is thought to have been
principally a reaction to the punishments in Oates's case.' 5 '
The state constitutions enacted during and shortly after the Bill of Rights' ratification also counsel against a literal interpretation. Pennsylvania and South Carolina
each enacted constitutions during 1790, while ratification of the Bill of Rights was
still pending. In addition, Delaware and Kentucky enacted constitutions in 1792
during the year following the Bill of Rights' ratification. 15 2 All of these constitutions prohibited "cruel punishments," omitting entirely any reference to the term
"unusual." Numerous state constitutions enacted after the Founding period used this
same language.' 53 There is no evidence that this formulation was understood to
mean anything different from either the Eighth Amendment's proscription of "cruel
and unusual punishments" or the ban of the many state constitutions enacted during
the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods against "cruel or unusual"
punishments.
The obvious and marked difference in the literal meaning of the state constitutional formulations, the evident absence of any perceived difference, and the affirmative evidence in the history of the English Bill of Rights together point to the same
conclusion: the Founders did not understand the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause in a literal fashion and did not mean for a punishment's unusual nature to be
an invariable requirement of unconstitutionality. As then-Chief Justice Burger remarked in his Furman dissent: "There was no discussion of the inter-relationship of
the terms 'cruel' and 'unusual,' and there is nothing in the debates supporting the
inference that the Founding Fathers would have been receptive to torturous or
excessively cruel punishments even if usual in character or authorized by law."''
1987) (reprinting statement of dissenting Lords in the Titus Oates case).
0 Id. (emphasis added).
'
See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel andUnusualPunishmentInflicted:"The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
152 PA. STAT. ANN. CONST. art. 1, § 13 & Historical Note (2002) ("nor cruel punishments
inflicted"); S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1790) ("nor cruel punishments inflicted"), reprintedin
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supranote 147, at 616.
113 ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (1819); MISS. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (1817); R.I. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8 (1843); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. I., § 14 (1889); cf. MICH.
CONST. art. I § 18 (1838) ("[C]ruel and unjust punishments shall not be inflicted.").

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
Whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different
from "cruel" is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to
114
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The phrases "cruel and unusual," "cruel or unusual," and "cruel" were instead
understood as referring to a single concept of inhumane or cruel punishment.
Chief Justice Burger's observation highlights a second reason for rejecting a
literal reading: it is implausible and unappealing as a matter of principle to condemn
cruel punishments only when infrequently employed. According to the Court and
common usage, a punishment is "cruel" if it inflicts pain without reason.'5 5 One
might plausibly believe that cruel punishments would be unusual in a democracy,
which has the constraints of legislative authorization, publicity, and judicial review.
But cruelty and frequency are separable concepts, and the relationship between them
is contingent, not necessary. As Chief Justice Burger's observation reflects, a cruel
punishment is unacceptable in its own right regardless of the frequency with which
it is employed.

15 6

In fact, a harsh punishment's frequency is often thought to increase,not decrease,
the need for condemnation and prohibition.'57 The example of torture illustrates the
point. Some philosophers and jurists maintain that torture can be justified in extremely
limited circumstances.' 58 The unusual nature of torture is said to be the key to its acceptability, prompting Professor Alan Dershowitz to call for "torture warrants" designed to sharply limit its use. 59 One of the main arguments advanced in support of
a categorical prohibition against torture is the slippery slope fear that, once legitimized
in principle, torture will be too commonly employed. 60 The death penalty debate
consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between
cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. These cases
indicate that the Court simply examines the particular punishment
involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment,
without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the
word "unusual."
Id. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
5 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
156 As Professors Murphy and Coleman explain, "The very punishments
clearly intended
by the Founding Fathers to be banned by this amendment - torture and mutilation - will
become acceptable if we simply begin inflicting them often enough so that they become
common rather than rare! How absurd." MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 3.
117 Cf Furman, 408 U.S. at 250 n. 15 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing greater
frequency
with which African Americans are executed as a factor indicating bias and therefore unconstitutionality).
158 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 44, at 142-49.
159

Id. at 141-59.

Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? PragmaticAbsolutism and Official
Disobedience,88 MiNN. L. REv. 1481, 1506 (2004); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack
and the Screw: ConstitutionalConstraints on Torture in the War On Terror,6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 278, 322 (2003); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment":
The Ban On Torture In The Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013, 2044 (2003)
(quoting SLAVOJ ZIZEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL 103 (2002)) (noting that
Dershowitz's view has been characterized "as 'extremely dangerous' insofar as 'it gives
160
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follows a parallel track. Again, a major argument against the death penalty concedes the punishment's acceptability when reserved for the very few worst cases. 6 '
The death penalty becomes unacceptable, the argument runs, when various flaws in
'
the penalty's implementation make it too common. 62
As such standard arguments against torture and the death penalty attest, harsh
punishments are often viewed as unacceptable not because they are unusual, but
rather because, in part, they are too common. It is implausible to believe that the
Founders inhabited a moral world so vastly different from our own that they were
fastened to a rigid belief that fundamentally immoral punishments are, by definition,
unusual. The limited evidence belies any such suggestion. In the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, for instance, the Anti-federalist Patrick Henry expressed concern that
lack of a constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments would
allow Congress to "introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany - of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.' ' 163 Henry's abhorrence of torture was not
premised on its infrequency. He noted that this was the civil law "practice" and
feared that, under the proposed Constitution, Congress would regularize its use."
Chief Justice Burger was correct in his suggestion that it is quite unlikely that the
Founders would have abandoned objections to torture based upon an understanding
that it is practiced with regularity.' 65
This analysis points to a third reason why the Eighth Amendment should not be
interpreted to prohibit only cruel punishments that are also unusual. The Court has
repeatedly declared that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment evolves according
to contemporary standards of decency. 166 Whatever the Founders' view, the modem
understanding is that the relationship between an unacceptable punishment and the
frequency of its use is contingent, not definitional. The Court now relies on legislative judgments that outlaw punishments for reasons unrelated to the frequency of
their use. In holding that the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the mentally

legitimacy to torture, and thus opens up the space for more illicit torture'); W.L. Twining
& P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR.LEGAL Q. 305, 348-49 (1973).
161 See, e.g., Furman,408 U.S. at 293-94 (citing doubts about whether the death penalty
was really reserved for the worst cases as reason to overturn the statute).
162

E.g., ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPrTALPUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GoVERNOR'S

COMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT i (2002) ("All members ofthe Commission believe, with

the advantage of hindsight, that the death penalty has been applied too often in Illinois since it
was reestablished in 1977.").
163 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 149, at 377.
164 Id.
165 Furman, 408 U.S. at 377 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
166 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 348 n.13 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The
[Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.").
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retarded, Atkins v. Virginia'6 7 cited the substantial and growing number of states that
had categorically prohibited this punishment.168 It is highly unlikely that any, much
less all or most, of these states were persuaded to this position because of such a
punishment's infrequent imposition. The Court's opinion reflects that the bar's animating rationale instead appeals to retardation's impact on desert, deterrence, and
public perceptions. The Eighth Amendment's evolving meaning should thus incorporate the widely shared modem understanding that a punishment may be fundamentally indecent without being unusual.
This by no means implies that the Court must treat prevailing punishment
practices as irrelevant. In light ofthe uncertain nature ofpunishment's actual effects,
such practices can furnish useful indicia of whether a punishment significantly
advances legitimate penological objectives. In addition, the Court has defended
reliance on prevailing practice as a check on judicial subjectivity.' 69 While these are
relevant considerations, they are also defeasible. Unlike a literal reading of the text,
they do not support imposition of an unyielding requirement that a constitutionally
prohibited punishment be unusual.
B. Justice Scalia's Originalism
As an alternative to literalism, the Court could adopt Justice Scalia's characteristically distinctive understanding. Justice Scalia's jurisprudence blends originalism
with societal tradition. He proceeds from the familiar originalist tenet that the Eighth
Amendment must be assigned the meaning it had for the state and federal legislators
who made it law. As in the Court's substantive due process decisions, 70 Justice
Scalia has indicated that, at least in principle, longstanding societal traditions may
supplement the original meaning.17
From this hybrid originalism, Justice Scalia draws a number of conclusions.
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, he maintains, prohibits only "alwaysand-everywhere 'cruel' punishments."' 7 2 A given punishment is either unconstitutional for all offenses or no offenses. A punishment may qualify as "always-and536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 313-17.
169 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at
103 (arguing that by the "evolving standards of decency" test the Court avoids "reliance
upon personal preferences").
170 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 588, 596-99 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (plurality opinion).
17 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805, 824-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 849, 861-62, 864 (1989).
172 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167
168
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everywhere" unconstitutional if it is one of "' those modes or acts of punishment that
had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted." ' 7 3 "[T]he rack and the thumbscrew"' 74 satisfy this test, as does torture.
An obvious corollary of this "always-and-everywhere" position is that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause does not prohibit punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the offense. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 75 Justice Scalia accordingly
76
rejected a principle of proportionality as contrary to the original understanding.
Justice Scalia's view effectively drains the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of contemporary import. Those punishments that the Founders did regard
as per se unacceptable, such as the rack and thumbscrew, had already fallen into
disuse in the eighteenth century and furnish no significant constraint in the modem
world.' 77 Analogies to punishments at the time of the founding must consider that
the Founders thought physical mutilation permissible.17 Needless to say, there is
no obvious line separating the rack and torture, on the one hand, from the removal
of ears and limbs, on the other.
No modem modes of punishment come to mind as falling on the rack or torture
side of the line. 179 Terms of imprisonment are always constitutional, no matter how
great their length, how minor the offense, or how sadistic the reason for their imposition. The death penalty is likewise constitutional regardless of the offense or
offender. The Constitution's text, Justice Scalia has said, "clearly permits the death
penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty is not
80
one ofthe 'cruel and unusual punishments' prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."
171Id. at

339 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).

114Id. at 349.
171501 U.S. 957
176

(1991) (plurality opinion).

Id. at 966-90.

See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1206-07 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Mutilation, particularly removing an ear, was an accepted punishment in the Colonies.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993). For
instance, Jefferson's 1779 Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments proposed castration instead of death for the offenses of rape and sodomy and "for people who maimed or
disfigured others, he proposed maiming and disfiguring in kind." Id.
at 73. Just as the Fifth
Amendment contemplates use of the death penalty, it recognizes the legitimacy of physical
mutilation, providing: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
"9 It is highly doubtful that even the accounts of mistreatment of prisoners in Afghanistan
and Iraq would describe cruel and unusual punishment. First, it is not clear that the reported
mistreatment would fit the definition of "torture" in an eighteenth century that countenanced
amputation. Second, in light of the mistreatment's avowed purpose of extracting useful information rather than of exacting suffering as retribution for a past wrong, it arguably does
not constitute "punishment." Third, an eighteenth century understanding probably would not
support extraterritorial application of the Eighth Amendment.
180 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
171
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The Founders simply did not regard imprisonment or the death penalty as punishments that are "always-and-everywhere" unacceptable.
Justice Scalia has declared that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause also
outlaws "modes of punishment that are inconsistent with modem 'standards of
decency,' as evinced by objective indicia, the most important of which is 'legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures.""' 18 ' However, as in the Court's substantive
due process cases, he has been so demanding of the required objective support that,
during his eighteen years on the Court, he has never found a punishment rendered
unconstitutional by any such modem standard of decency.182
In consequence of its restrictiveness, Justice Scalia's approach would remove
inconsistencies in the Court's jurisprudence and make it more coherent. 83 It would
entail rejection of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence in its entirety, thereby
ending the tensions between the principles of guided discretion and mercy and between the Court's active pursuit of proportionality in its death penalty cases and its
disinterest elsewhere.
At the same time it resolves some of theinconsistencies in the Court's jurisprudence, the extreme narrowness of Justice Scalia's understanding fuels disqualifying
originalist and contemporary criticisms of it. Formal coherence would come at the
cost of substantive defensibility.
1. Originalist Premises
A wide array of considerations - the English Bill of Rights, the text, paradigm
examples, the Founders' acceptance of proportionality, and their distrust of government- lead to the conclusion that Justice Scalia's reading conflicts with the original
understanding.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,339-40 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989)).
182 Cf. Scalia, supra note 171, at 864 (expressing confidence that in the "vast majority"
of cases in which he has rejected a nonoriginalist view, "even if the provision in question has
an evolutionary content, there is inadequate indication that any evolution in social attitudes
has occurred."); David M. Zlotnick, Battered Women &JusticeScalia,41 ARIZ. L. REV. 847,
857 (1999) ("Scalia's threshold for departing from originalism is so high that while theoretically possible, its conditions could rarely, if ever, be met. Not surprisingly, Scalia has yet
to concede that the conditions.., have been met while he has been a sitting Justice.").
183 Given the imprimatur the Constitution's text places upon that punishment, the only live
issue would seem to be whether particularly painful methods of imposing death may constitute
the functional equivalent of torture.
181
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a. The English Bill of Rights
The text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was drawn essentially
verbatim from that of the English Bill of Rights, enacted in 1689."84 The history of
that Bill's enactment provides no support whatever for limiting the ban against cruel
and unusual punishments to punishments that are "always-and-everywhere"' 85 unacceptable. It strongly supports the opposing view that the ban was meant to outlaw
punishments that, while permissible in some circumstances, are disproportionate for
the offense and offender at hand.
86
The Bill was evidently inspired by objections to Titus Oates's punishments.
Oates, a Protestant cleric, had falsely sworn that he had overheard a number of
Catholics hatch a "Popish Plot" to overthrow King Charles II.' Based on Oates's
false testimony, fifteen of the alleged conspirators were executed. 8 In 1685, Oates
was convicted of perjury. 8 9 The sentencing judge, who complained that the death
sentence was unavailable for Oates's offenses, ordered that he be stripped of his
clerical office, imprisoned for life, fined, pilloried, and whipped. 90 Oates appealed
to Parliament. 9'
Although the House of Lords rejected his appeal, dissenting Lords issued a
statement revealing that the English Bill of Rights' prohibition against "cruel and
unusual" punishments was understood to condemn disproportionate punishments."
That statement enumerated six objections to Oates's punishment. 93 The second
addressed the punishments of life imprisonment and whipping, declaring that "there is
[sic] no precedents to warrant the punishments of whipping and committing to prison
for life, for the crime of perjury."'9 The dissenting Lords, then, did not condemn
these punishments on the ground that they are universally impermissible. Indeed,
sentences of life imprisonment are meted out today and whipping "continued in use

'
185

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349.

186

5 COBBETr's PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 386-97 (1809) (recording the

Conference on the Bill for reversingthe Judgmentsagainst Oates, July 31, 1689); see also
Granucci, supra note 151, at 852-60.
'87 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969 (1991) (plurality opinion).
188

Id.

189 Id.

'90 Case of Titus Oates, (1685) 10 How. St. Tr. 1079, 1316 (K.B.), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 149, at 368-69.

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970.
Among other places, the statement is reprinted in Weems v. UnitedStates, 217 U.S.
349, 392 n.1 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
'93 Id. The first objection concerned stripping Oates of "his canonical and priestly habit,"
which the dissenters claimed was a matter "belonging to the ecclesiastical courts only." Id.
194 Id (emphasis added).
'9'
192
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in England until 1948."' g The dissenters instead objected based on grounds of proportionality, on the belief that such severe punishments were permissible for other
offenses but not "for the crime of perjury."' 9 6
In the dissenters' eyes, Oates's disproportionate punishments were "cruel, barbarous, and illegal" and violated the Bill of Rights' prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. 9 7 This should be unsurprising, given that proportionality is part of the
common meaning of the term "cruel" and that prior to the adoption of the English
Bill of Rights the common law prohibited excessive punishments. 9 8 "Not a single
peer ventured to affirm that the judgment was legal: but much was said about the
odious character of the appellant."'" "The House of Commons [subsequently] agreed
with the dissenting Lords" 2 ' and voted to overturn the judgment.2"'
Based on this same evidence, Justice Scalia draws the opposite conclusion that
it is "most unlikely that the English Cruell and Unusuall Punishments Clause was
meant to forbid 'disproportionate' punishments."2 2 According to Justice Scalia,
illegality, rather than disproportionality, explains the objections to Oates's sentence.
He notes that the term "unusual" was a synonym for "illegal," the term used in the
original version of the English Bill of Rights.2 3 Members of Parliament, Justice
Scalia maintains, condemned Oates's life sentence and whipping because these
punishments were authorized by neither legislation nor common law precedent.2 "4
This reading completely subverts Justice Scalia's "always-and-everywhere"2 5
position. If the English Bill of Rights merely requires that harsh punishments be
authorized by statute or common law precedent, then the category of punishments
that are "always-and-everywhere" unacceptable becomes an empty set. Even sadistic
torture would be permissible if legislatively authorized. At the same time, the Bill
would embrace a principle of proportionality. As in Oates's case, a harsh punishment
may be authorized for some grave offenses but not for lesser offenses. Justice
Scalia's view of the English Bill of Rights thus neither favors treating certain punishments as per se unacceptable nor excludes a proportionality principle.
Justice Scalia's explanation ofthe English Bill of Rights also appears inconsistent
with an undeniable part of the Eighth Amendment's original meaning. According to
'9' Granucci, supra note 151, at 859. See also Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 15, 1 Stat.
112, 115-16 (1845) (forging court records punishable by "whipp[ing] not exceeding thirtynine stripes").
196 Weems, 217 U.S. at 392 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
197 Id.

'98 Granucci, supra note 151, at 843-44, 846-47.
'99

200
201

6 THOMAS

B.

MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND

Granucci, supra note 151, at 858.
Id. at 858-59.

140 (1899).

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991) (plurality opinion).
203 Id.at 973-74.
204 Id.at 974.
20 Id.at 987.
202
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Justice Scalia, the English Bill of Rights requires only that harsh punishment be
lawful, that is, authorized by statute or precedent. So interpreted, the ban furnishes
no constraint whatever on legislatures. Any punishment authorized by statute would
be lawful and, hence, permissible. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, by
contrast, was meant primarily as a limit on legislative, not judicial, power.2" 6 The
Founders did not believe the English Bill of Rights irrelevant to their purposes, as
their choice of language indicates. Either Justice Scalia's rendition of the English
Bill of Rights is seriously in error, or the Founders fundamentally misconceived its
meaning.
Justice Scalia' s attempt to rescue the English Bill ofRights from such irrelevance
affirmatively supports rather than excludes a proportionality principle. According
to him, those who enacted the English Bill of Rights understood the term "cruell and
unusuall" to mean "cruel and illegal."2 7 But Justice Scalia suggests that the
Founders conceived of the term "unusual" as having its ordinary meaning of 'such
as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary practice."2
Translating "unusual" to mean
"extraordinary" rather than "illegal" undermines rather than supports Justice Scalia' s
anti-proportionality position. A punishment may be out of the ordinary for some
offenses but not others. The Oates case illustrates this very point: Members of
Parliament condemned life imprisonment and whipping for Oates's perjury offense,
not for all offenses.20 9
If the Founders were at all familiar with the history of the English Bill of Rights,
their decision to adopt its text undermines Justice Scalia's anti-proportionality
position. It indicates adoption of a proportionality requirement, not a desire to prohibit only those punishments that are "always-and-everywhere ' 21" unacceptable.
b. The text
As the Court's cases reflect, the common understanding of a "cruel" punishment
is one that is unnecessarily harsh. Part and parcel of that same understanding is that
a punishment may be unnecessarily harsh for one purpose but not for another.
The recorded comments on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
speak of it as being directed to Congress. 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supranote 149,
at 377 (remarks of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention); id. (remarks of
Abraham Holmes in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks of Rep. Livermore); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
975-76 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he provision must have been meant as a check not upon
judges but upon the Legislature.").
207 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973 (plurality opinion).
208 Id.at 976 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1826)).
209 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 392 n.l (White, J., dissenting). Even Oates's
defrocking was not thought to be per se unacceptable. It was regarded as a fitting punishment
for an ecclesiastical body to impose, though not for one of the King's courts. Id.
210 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987 (plurality opinion).
206
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For instance, in today's world, ten years imprisonment at hard labor would be
gratuitously harsh and therefore "cruel" for a minor shoplifting offense, but not for
homicide. The same may be said of the term "unusual." One imagines this is why the
Court has said that life imprisonment for an overtime parking offense would be
unconstitutional t but has upheld life sentences for other offenses involving more
aggravated culpability or harms such as a pattern of property offenses 12 and
possession of a large quantity of cocaine.2 3 This same understanding traces back
through to the Founders' world to at least seventeenth century England, as the
objections to Oates's punishments reveal." 4 Justice Scalia's interpretation, which
limits the Eighth Amendment's ban to punishments that are inhumane in all contexts,
21 5
distorts the ordinary meaning of both of the Eighth Amendment's key terms.
c. Torture and the rack
The Founders made very few recorded comments about the Eighth Amendment
during the ratification and amendment processes. In the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Abraham Holmes, an Anti-federalist, objected that the original Constitution
did not restrain Congress "from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments"
and furnished "no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be
amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline., 21 6 Patrick Henry, a delegate to
the Virginia Ratification Convention and also an Anti-federalist, pressed a similar objection. He complained that, whereas the Virginia Constitution prohibited the Virginia
Legislature from employing cruel and unusual punishments, the original Constitution

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501 U.S.
at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 310 n.2 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 274 n.l (1980).
212 Rummel, 445 U.S. 263.
213 Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.
214 Other evidence indicates that it has much earlier roots. See infra note 225.
215 This conclusion is not inconsistent with the preceding section, which argued against an
approach that relies on the literal meaning of the text partly because the Founders did not understand the conjunction "and" between the terms "cruel" and "unusual" literally. That hardly
renders the terms "cruel" and "unusual" irrelevant as a guide to the Founders' understanding.
Justice Scalia argues that "it would seem quite peculiar to refer to cruelty and unusualness
for the offense in question, in a provision having application only to a new government that
had never before defined offenses, and that would be defining new and peculiarly national
ones." Harmelin,501 U.S. at 978 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). This argument
rests on an implausible view that, in the eyes of the Founders, new offenses enacted by the
federal government would be incommensurable with existing offenses and their punishments.
216 5 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTrrUTION, supranote 149, at 377 (remarks of Abraham Holmes
in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention).
211
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permitted Congress to "admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment."21 7
George Mason, another delegate, echoed the belief that "torture was included" in the
Virginia prohibition.2 18
Contrary to Justice Scalia's claims, these snippets fall considerably short of revealing any intent to limit the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to punishments
that are "always-and-everywhere ' 21 9 inhumane. Holmes and Henry were Antifederalists who sought to discredit the original Constitution by highlighting the
potential for extreme abuses. Punishments such as torture and the rack, which were
regarded as objectionable no matter what the context, fit this Anti-federalist agenda
perfectly. While the comments of Holmes and Henry indicate that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was meant to proscribe torture and the rack, they contain no whisper of an intent to limit the Clause's reach to these examples.
In fact, Justice Scalia's limiting interpretation makes it difficult to explain the few
other remaining comments recorded during the drafting and ratification processes.
In the First Congress, Representative Smith protested that the phrase "cruel and
unusual punishments" had "too indefinite" an import. 220 Similarly, Representative
Livermore remarked that "[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity,
on which account I have no objection to it; but.., it seems to have no meaning in
''221 It would
it.
have been easy to reply that these objections were misguided because
the phrase had the definite and limited meaning of prohibiting only those punishments already believed to be across-the-board unacceptable. Insofar as the record
reflects, no one did so. Instead, the House of Representatives approved the Eighth
Amendment "by a considerable majority,, 222 presumably in spite of the text's perceived indeterminancy. This affords little solace for the view that the Clause prohibits only "always and everywhere ' 223 unacceptable punishments analogous to
2 24
torture and the rack in their extremity.

217
218
219
220

Id. (remarks of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention).
Id. (remarks of George Mason in the Virginia Ratifying Convention).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987 (plurality opinion).
1 ANNALS OF CONG.

221

Id.

222

Id.at 783.

782 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987 (plurality opinion).
Unlike Justice Scalia, Granucci acknowledges that the English Bill of Rights was meant
to prohibit grossly disproportionate punishments. Granucci, supranote 151, at 860. However,
he believes that the Founders misinterpreted the Bill as a prohibition only against barbarous
punishments unacceptable in any context. Id.
at 860-65. The evidence on which he relies is
quite thin. Like Justice Scalia, he relies on the Anti-federalist statements discussed in the text
of this article. Id.
at 840-42. As an explanation for how the Founders came to misread the
English Bill of Rights, he suggests that the Founders misread Blackstone's passing reference
to it in his Commentaries. Id.
at 862-65. However, the only support he offers for this suggestion is a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court from 1963. Id.
at 865.
223

224
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An originalist should want to consult the reasons why the Founders regarded
torture as unacceptable.22 5 In line with Justice Scalia's view, one might be tempted
226
to answer that it is because they viewed torture as "always and everywhere,
unacceptable. But this answer is facile because it does not explain why torture was
thought per se unacceptable. The explanation, one may surmise, is that torture was
thought gratuitously harsh. One punishment - the rack, for example - may be
gratuitously harsh no matter what the offense. But other punishments - a sentence
of life imprisonment, for example - may be gratuitously harsh for some but not
other offenses. This explanation takes punishments specifically mentioned by the
Founders for the extreme examples they were intended to be. Unlike Justice Scalia's
view, this explanation permits the indeterminate language of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause to reach beyond the extreme examples touted by the Antifederalists and coheres with the text and the history of the English Bill of Rights.
d. The wide acceptance ofproportionality

The idea of proportionate punishments appears to have been entirely uncontroversial then, as it remains now. The Founders were certainly familiar with this principle,
which runs from Aristotle and the Bible up through the Magna Carta, the English Bill
of Rights, and Blackstone.227 There is no evidence that anyone disputed that a
The Founders presumably would want ambiguities to be resolved in a manner that
gives due weight to the reasons for which they adopted the provision in question.
225

226

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987 (plurality opinion).

227

The eighteenth century criminologist Cesare Beccaria is generally credited with the

first systematic exposition of proportionality. See W.Y. TSAO, RATIONAL APPROACH

TO

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE TREND TOWARD INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISH-

29-30 (1955). Montesquieu, also writing in the
eighteenth century, likewise wrote of the "essential point, that there should be a certain
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

proportion in punishments." MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. 6, ch. 16 (1748), excerpted
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supranote 149, at 370. See also TSAO, supra,at 29.
"Blackstone in his Commentarieson the Laws of England insisted that 'punishment ought

always to be proportioned to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means to
exceed it."' TONRY, supranote 132, at 142 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 40 (N. Walker ed., 1999)). Blackstone was widely read in the

Colonies. Granucci, supra note 151, at 862 ("Demand for Blackstone's work was heavy in
the colonies.").
As the dissenting Lords' objections to Oates's punishments reveal, proportionality also
was part of the moral and legal vocabulary in the seventeenth century as well. See supra
notes 187-201 and accompanying text. Indeed, "by the year 1400, we have the expression
of 'the long standing principle of English law that the punishment should fit the crime."'
Granucci, supra note 151, at 846.
There is some dispute about the extent to which the Founders were familiar with and
influenced by Cesare Beccaria. Compare Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment
ProportionalityAnalysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378,381-82 (1980) ("[O]ne cannot find a causal connection between Beccaria's
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punishment's severity should vary according to the gravity of offense or, more
generally, the reasons for punishment. The Founders would have had no ground to
condemn only those punishments thought unduly harsh for all offenses. The
accordion-like expansion and contraction of the death penalty in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, which was prompted by changing perceptions of the seriousness of various offenses,22 demonstrate a deep commitment to proportionality
work and the known history of the [E]ighth [A]mendment."), with Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An
HistoricalJustificationfor the Weems v. United States Excessive PunishmentDoctrine,24
BUFF. L. REv. 783, 813-23 (1975) ("The force of Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and
Punishmentswas felt as much in America as in Europe."). Whether or not Beccaria was widely
read in the Colonies, the Founders were well aware of proportionality as a principle of
punishment. For instance, Jefferson introduced a bill in the Virginia Legislature entitled, "A
Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments." See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying
text. Some early state constitutions included provisions requiring that penalties be "proportioned to the nature of the offense." N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII (1784). See also PA.
CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 38 (1776), reprintedin THE ROOTS, supra note 145, at
273; Matthew W. Meskell, Note, An American Resolution: The History of Prisons in the
United Statesfrom 1777 to 1877,51 STAN. L. REv. 839, 844 (1999) ("Pennsylvania's 'Great
Law' of 1682 carefully laid out a code of punishments that ascended in severity depending
on the depravity and social consequences of the crimes - the same careful balancing and
proportionality Beccaria urged a century later.").
Of the explicit mention of proportionality in the New Hampshire Bill of Rights of 1783,
N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS art. XVIII (1783), reprintedin THE ROOTS, supra note 145, at 377,
Professor Parr echoes Justice Scalia in arguing that "the Founders' rejection of the New
Hampshire approach is strong evidence that they declined to include a proportionality
requirement in the Eighth Amendment." Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality:A New
Perspectiveon the Cruel and UnusualPunishmentClause,68 TENN. L. REv. 41,48 (2000).

See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977-78 (plurality opinion). But there is no evidence that the
Founders deliberately rejected what the New Hampshire Bill of Rights makes explicit.
Madison, as a Representative from Virginia, proposed what became the Eighth Amendment
in the First Congress. He took the text verbatim from the Virginia provision, which in turn
derived from the English Bill of Rights. There is no indication that Madison or anyone else
understood the Virginia and New Hampshire provisions as having different meanings and
made a deliberate choice between them, thereby "reject[ing]" the "New Hampshire approach."
Parr, supra,at48. SeeHarmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 (plurality opinion) ("The Eighth Amendment
received little attention during the proposal and adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights.");
LEONARD W. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 411 (1968) ("The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and

constitutions simply does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a diligent or
systematic one."). As the dissenting Lords' statement in the Oates's case illustrates, the
English - and by inference the colonists - understood the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishment" to require that punishments be "proportioned to the nature of the offence," just
as the New Hampshire Bill of Rights explicitly states. N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS art. XVIII
(1783), reprintedin THE ROOTS, supra note 145, at 377.

221 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6-9 (2002).
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capable of inspiring much political action. So, too, does Parliament's reaction to
Titus Oates's case.
The evidence that Justice Scalia cites as indicating rejection of a proportionality
principle instead merely indicates disagreement over what it requires. Then, as now,
the debate centered on what proportionality requires and whether existing law authorizes unduly harsh punishments. For instance, a central theme of Jefferson's 1779
Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments was the elimination of the death
penalty for offenses other than murder and treason. 229 The Virginia Legislature
narrowly rejected Jefferson's proposal.23 It is wildly implausible to believe that the
Virginia Legislature, first, agreed with Jefferson that death is disproportionate for
all offenses except treason and murder and, second, tossed proportionality aside and
decided to employ such disproportionate punishments anyway. The Virginia Legislature is far more easily and naturally seen as disagreeing with Jefferson that death
is proportionate only for those two offenses.23'
Justice Scalia's treatment ofother evidence likewise confuses disagreement over
what proportionality requires with rejection ofproportionality altogether. According
to him, punishments authorized by the First Congress "belie any doctrine of proportionality., 23 2 He observes that the express proportionality provision in the New
Hampshire Constitution of 1784 states that "'[n]o wise legislature will affix the
same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do to those
of murder and treason. 233 The First Congress authorized the death penalty not only
for murder and treason but also, he misleadingly reports, for "forgery of United
States securities, [and] 'run[ning] away with [a] ship or vessel, or any goods or
merchandise to the value of fifty dollars." 23 4 However, the only coherent reading
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments (1779), reprinted
in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 95-102 (Saul Padover ed., 1943).
230 FRIEDMAN, supranote 178, at 73.
229

23

Due to Quaker influence, Pennsylvania played a leading role in curtailing the use of

the death penalty. Pennsylvania did not abolish the death penalty for robbery, burglary, and
sodomy until 1790. Id. Virginia eventually did limit the death penalty to murder "and certain
crimes committed by slaves," but not until 1796. Id.
232 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 980 (plurality opinion).
233 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII (1784)).
234

Id. at 980-81 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790,

ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1845). Justice Scalia's description is misleading, if not disingenuous. It wrongly indicates that death was the punishment for simple theft of goods or a
ship. In fact, theft of goods or a ship was punishable by death only if linked to piracy or
mutiny. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1845). The First Congress provided that, inter alia, the offense applied to one who 'piraticallyand feloniously run[s] away
with ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars" and who is
thereby "adjudged to be a pirate." Id. (emphasis added). Given that the offense targeted
piracy, which was the eighteenth century's terrorism, the First Congress undoubtedly and
with good justification regarded it as more serious than ordinary theft of property. Simple
theft was not even punishable by imprisonment. § 16, 1 Stat. at 116.
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of the evidence is that the First Congress simply disagreed with the New Hampshire
Constitution's broad-brush statements about proportionality's dictates. It believed
that death was proportionate for large-scale theft in the course ofpiracy and one type
of forgery, as well as for murder and treason. Instead of rejecting a principle of
proportionality, the structure of the first federal criminal code transparently reflects
careful judgments about the relative seriousness of offenses and a concomitant desire
to tailor punishment to social harm and culpability.235 Whether or not it is strong
affirmative support for a constitutional requirement of proportionality, it is certainly
compatible with it.
Finally, it does not seem at all likely that the Founders accepted the doctrine of
proportionality but wished to deny judges authority to implement it. An important
contemporary prudential objection to a constitutional requirement of proportionality
maintains that its judicial enforcement would be unacceptably subjective.236 Yet, as
the Court has recognized, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "excessive"
bail expressly adopts a proportionality principle.237 That principle is plainly addressed
to judges, who have always had very substantial control over bail. The Excessive

Justice Scalia also neglected to mention that while forgery of securities of the United

States triggered the death penalty, alteration ofjudicial records so as to affect the outcome
of a proceeding was only punishable by up to seven years imprisonment. §§ 14-15, 1 Stat.

at 115-16. It is quite obvious that the First Congress's decision to punish forgery of United
States securities by death but notjudicial records reflects judgments about proportionality and
the relative seriousness of these two offenses, not rejection of proportionality.
211 It prescribes death for treason but a maximum of seven years imprisonment for failing
to inform authorities of a treason committed by another. §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 112. Similarly, the
code provides for death for murder on federal property but only a maximum of three years
imprisonment for a failure to report such a murder committed by another. §§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. at
113. Piracy is punished by death but confederacy with a pirate only by up to three years
imprisonment. §§ 8, 12, 1 Stat. at 113-15.
Whereas the sentence for murder on federal property was death, an offender who
purposely and maliciously maimed another on such property could be punished only by a
maximum of seven years of imprisonment, and one who committed manslaughter on federal
property could receive no more than three years. §§ 3, 7, 13, 1 Stat. at 113, 115.
A large-scale theft committed in the course of piracy carried the death penalty, but
simple theft was not even punishable by imprisonment. §§ 8, 16, 1 Stat. at 113-14, 116. The
penalties for larceny in an area subject to federal jurisdiction consisted ofa fine not exceeding
fourfold the value of the property stolen and up to thirty-nine lashes with a whip. § 16, 1 Stat.
at 116.
Alteration of judicial records in a way that changed a proceeding's outcome was
punishable by up to seven years imprisonment, perjury by up to three years, and obstructing
service of process by up to a year. §§ 15, 18, 22, 1 Stat. at 115-17.
236 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 (plurality opinion).
237 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1998).
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Bail Clause belies the suggestion that the Founders feared that judicial implementation of proportionality would be objectionably subjective.238
e. Distrustofgovernment
The Founders were not so sanguine about the use of governmental power that
they thought of the Bill of Rights as a symbolic constraint on imaginary, speculative,
or already abandoned abuses. The inclusion of these rights in the Constitution was
prompted by the objections of Anti-federalists, who feared that even the representative government established by the Constitution would trench on individual rights.239
To win ratification of the original Constitution in Virginia and seven other states,
Madison and other Federalists assuaged these fears by promising amendments protecting such rights.24
The Bill of Rights should not be and has not been read cynically as a meaningless sop to exaggerated and baseless Anti-federalist fears. 24 ' Given the necessity of
Anti-federalist support for ratification and the role of a promised Bill of Rights in
securing that support, originalist precepts required taking Anti-federalist distrust of
government seriously. The Founders presumably meant for the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause to play an active role in checking government through time
against a real danger of new abuses. This desire provides some evidence that they
242
did not mean to limit that Clause to punishments that are "always and everywhere"
unacceptable, which effectively treats the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as
a symbolic condemnation of past abuses.
2. The Need for Judicial Review
The Court has eschewed a narrowly originalist reading of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and has declared that the Clause's meaning evolves through time.243

Such worries about judicial subjectivity presuppose a familiarity with and acceptance
of the idea ofjudicial supremacy, which were lacking in the Founders' world. The institution
ofjudicial review that developed after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
was without historical precedent in the late eighteenth century. The Founders apparently gave
virtually no thought to it, and the evidence does not support attributing to them any settled
or widely shared view.
238

239

See

ALFRED

H.

KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND

DEVELOPMENT 108-10 (6th ed. 1983) (providing an account of this very familiar story).
240 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 569 (1985) (Powell, J.,

dissenting) ("[E]ight States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to
be adopted after ratification.").
241 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) ("The fears of the Antifederalists were well founded.").
242 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 987 (plurality opinion).
243 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956).
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Insofar as non-originalist considerations deserve weight, 2" they militate against
adoption of a view that treats the Clause as effectively empty of concrete meaning
in today's world. Precedent, the gravity of the individual interest at stake, and the
inadequacy of political processes all point to a need for meaningful judicial review.
The next section takes up the discussion of these points because they also reveal the
shortcomings of a third approach to the Clause, which can be called majoritarianism.
They establish not only a need for a judicial check, but also one that is countermajoritarian in character and that does not blithely accept the prevailing outcome of
political processes as fixing the constitutional baseline.
C. Majoritarianism

The Court's cases profess to rely largely on prevailing punishment practices to
define cruel and unusual punishments.24 5 Consistent adherence to custom ostensibly
has strong appeal. It arguably would narrow the gap that now exists between the
rhetoric and results of the Court's decisions, enhance their legitimacy, curb judicial
subjectivity, and treat the Clause as something other than a dead letter.
1. Minimization or Relocation of Judicial Subjectivity?
One can point to good reasons for judicial restraint and deference respecting
criminal punishments. Punishment comes into play only after the accused has been
convicted, thereby implicating powerful governmental interests in deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. No objective science dictates an unassailably correct mode
and level of punishment as a matter of utility or justice. The appropriate punishment
for any given offense results from some artful mix of empirical prediction and moral
judgment. Reasonable persons can reach significantly different conclusions about the
relative weight of relevant values, the future consequences of harsher and more lenient
sentences, and the appropriate punishment for offenses generally and in particular
cases. It seems obvious that legislatures, sentencing judges, and juries are far better
On one view, going beyond history is inevitable. The historical evidence is conflicting
and unsettled not only on the nature of the judicial role in general and on the meaning of
specific provisions. The generality of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause's text and
the exceedingly thin nature of its drafting and ratification history give future interpreters
great interpretive freedom, necessitating reliance on extra-originalist considerations. On
another, it is desirable to go beyond history because neither the cause of democracy nor the
Constitution's legitimacy is best served by following two-hundred-year-old decisions for
their own sake. In other words, it is undesirable and undemocratic to be ruled by "the dead
244

hand of the past." Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the DeadHandof the Past,66

L. REv. 1127 (1998). That the polity that adopted the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights excluded African Americans, women, and propertyless males only strengthens the
GEO. WASH.

point. See id.
245 See supra Part I.B.
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situated to make such malleable judgments than are Supreme Court Justices. These
considerations, combined with the indeterminacy of the constitutional text and
history, raise the specter of judicial subjectivity. These are all excellent reasons for
caution about giving judges authority to declare criminal punishments unconstitutional.
It nonetheless is by no means obvious that, as the Court claims,246 reliance on
custom effectively limits judicial subjectivity. Custom's definition is itself fundamentally subjective, as indicated by the Justices' regular disagreements over basic
methodological questions.
To begin, the Justices have sent conflicting messages over how many jurisdictions must embrace a given practice so that departures become unconstitutional.
248
Like Atkins v. Virginia247 before it, this past Term's decision in Roper v. Simmons
holds that a practice's rejection by thirty States may establish its unconstitutionality.249 But inother cases, the Court has held that rejection by a significantly greater
number of States - thirty-nine in Tison v. Arizona2 "0 and forty in Montana v.
Egelhoffj5 -fails to establish unconstitutionality. 2 2 Whenever the Court wishes
to set the bar high, it can invoke the cause of federalism. "Absent a constitutionally
imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism," it has warned,
"some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more
25 3
severely than any other State.
The Justices have also disputed how long a practice must have persisted so that
departures from it become unconstitutional. In Roper and Atkins, the Court gave
greater weight to recent legislation.2 54 Dissenting Justices argued that the Court had

See supranote 46.
536 U.S. 304, 3.13-15 (2002) (finding that legislative rejection by thirty states was
sufficient to support holding execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional).
248 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
249 Id. at 1192-94.
250 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (upholding death for major participation in a felony with
reckless indifference to life when only eleven States permitted such punishment).
251 518 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1996) (plurality opinion) (upholding limits on relevance of
voluntary intoxication rejected by forty states). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (plurality opinion) (upholding punishment "virtually unique in its harshness"); id.
at
47 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1025-27 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's decision to uphold a sentence of life without parole that
no other jurisdiction would have imposed); cf Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987)
("We are aware that all but two of the States... have abandoned the common-law rule ....
But the question remains whether those [two] States are in violation of the Constitution.").
252 Tison, 481 U.S. at 154, 158; Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48-49.
253 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980); accordHarmelin,501 U.S. at 1000
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam).
254 Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1193; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16 (2002).
246
247
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matters backwards and chastised the Court for the myopia of basing "'sweeping
255
constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of [a few] years.'
The Justices have taken different and sometimes seemingly inconsistent views
on how specifically legislatures must address the issue at hand. In Roper, Justice
Scalia argued that the twenty non-death penalty states can form no part of any consensus against the use of death for juvenile offenders." 6 Such states, he reasoned,
cannot have addressed the particular issue at hand.257 But as evidence of support for
such a punishment, Justice Scalia was willing to rely on the nineteen states whose
death penalty statutes did not indicate a minimum age and where authority to execute
juveniles derives from provisions concerning whetherjuveniles maybe tried as adults
generally, which govern by default.258 In Stanfordv.Kentucky, 25 9 Justice Brennan did
precisely the opposite, counting non-death states as evidencing a consensus against
executing juveniles and ignoring those states authorizing death through provisions
260
covering felonies generally.
Another source of contention has been the relative weight of legislative enactments versus charging and sentencing decisions. As evidence that the death penalty
violated evolving standards of decency, some of the opinions in Furman relied upon
the increasing infrequency with which prosecutors sought and juries imposed death.261
The Furman dissenters, for their part, sought to explain such prosecutorial and jury
decisions on grounds other than categorical rejection of death, and relied instead on
legislative authorization for the death penalty in forty states, the District of Columbia,
and in federal courts.262 The wave of death penalty statutes enacted in reaction to
Furman263 has prompted Justice O'Connor to warn of the "mistake" of inferring a
societal consensus based upon prosecutorial and jury decisions.264 It is evident that
some of the Justices believe that such decisions merit little, if any, weight.265
255

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Coker

v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
256 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 1219.
258
259

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 867-68 & n.3 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

260

Id. at 384-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295-301 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id at

261

492 U.S. 361 (1989).

360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
262 Id. at 386-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 436-43 (Powell, J., dissenting).
263 "[A]t least 35 States" enacted death penalty statutes within the four years following
Furman.Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976). (plurality opinion).
264 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 855 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
265 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 346-47 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that
the frequency with which juries impose death on retarded offenders is entitled to no weight);
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75 (explaining jury and prosecutorial decisions not to seek death
for juveniles on grounds other than categorical opposition).
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Even more contentious are the status of other sources such as public opinion
polls,266 the views ofprofessional associations, 267 and international authorities. 268 The
Justices routinely fracture over these methodological issues,269 which cannot be
answered simply by analyzing the Constitution's text, history, or some other uncontroversial source. It is impossible to believe that the Justices' marked differences are
pristinely methodological and uninfluenced by their "subjective" political philosophies. Justice Scalia has never found a break with customary practice sufficient to
render a punishment unconstitutional, while other Justices have found a great many
to be so. 270 To a very considerable extent, then, an approach that defines cruel and
unusual punishment in terms of prevailing practice relocates and disingenuously
masks the source ofjudicial "subjectivity" rather than eliminates it.
2. The Need for a Countermajoritarian Check
Even assuming that a majoritarian approach does significantly limitjudicial subjectivity, the appropriate level of deference accorded to prevailing punishment practice
must reflect some balance between the need to constrain judicial subjectivity on the
one hand, and the need for a countermajoritarian check on the other. An approach
266

CompareAtkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.21 (relying upon public opinion polls), with id. at

328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding such reliance "seriously mistaken").
267 Compareid.at 316 n.21 (relying on views ofprofessional associations), with Stanford,
492 U.S. at 377 (finding views of professional associations irrelevant).
268 See supra note 2.
269 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005) (finding legislative
rejection by thirty states sufficient to support holding death for sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds unconstitutional), with id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Words have no meaning if
the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus.").
CompareAtkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15 (finding legislative rejection by thirty states sufficient
to support holding execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional), with id at 342-46
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982) (striking
down death penalty for felony murderers who merely participated in a robbery in which
death results because "only a small minority of jurisdictions - eight - allow the death
penalty" in such circumstances), with id. at 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the same statutory enactments as showing that "23 States permit a sentencer to impose the
death penalty even though the felony murderer has neither killed nor intended to kill his
victim.").
270 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306;
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); Stanford, 492 U.S.
at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,818 (1988) (plurality
opinion); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),
overruledby Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792; Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370,381 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,285 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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that defines cruel and unusual punishment in terms of prevailing practice always
resolves this dilemma in favor of constraining judicial subjectivity. It provides a
constraint, but one that, by definition, cannot ever have a countermajoritarian dimension. Furthermore, it is deliberately aimed at reigning in outliers from a majoritarian consensus. This resolution is unacceptable on three interrelated grounds.
a. The individualinterest
Harsh criminal punishment has an overwhelming impact on a convict's life.
Criminal punishment represents government at its most coercive. For affected
individuals, the stakes are much higher with respect to other forms of governmental
regulation. Criminal punishment may deprive a person of physical liberty for
decades - and even of life itself. The Court's death penalty jurisprudence correctly
recognizes that the need for judicial protection depends partly on the gravity of the
individual's interest.
b. Precedent
In other comparable constitutional contexts, the Court has assumed an active
countermajoritarian role. Strong competing governmental interests and textual
indeterminacy also exist in the contexts of freedom of speech, equal protection, and
criminal procedure. The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" is not qualitatively
more ambiguous than the "majestic generalities"27' of "freedom of speech" or "equal
protection of the laws." Contrary to the judicial role Justice Scalia's view of cruel
and unusual punishment implies, the Court has not bowed out of these areas entirely
and has not interpreted rights as addressed entirely to the abuses of a bygone era.
Nor has the Court deferred to the prevailing outcome of political processes to establish the general constitutional baselines. It is an obvious but important point that the
Court's independent interpretive role flows from these rights' countermajoritarian
design of protecting outcast groups that political majorities are particularly likely to
disrespect or ignore.
Insofar as the right to die and other substantive due process cases rely on tradition, they are distinguishable on two separate grounds. First, those cases fashion
textually unenumerated rights. Secondly, convicted and potential offenders are considerably less able to use political processes to protect their interests than are those
who seek to vindicate parental rights or a right to die.
Even more analogous than freedom of speech, equal protection, and an unenumerated right to die is the unenumerated substantive due process right to be free of
grossly disproportionate civil punitive damage awards.272 In a series of recent cases,
271
272

W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc:v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
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"the Court has articulated an increasingly robust requirement of proportionality
under the Due Process Clause in punitive damages cases. 273 The Court also has
read the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to forbid grossly disproportionate criminal fines. 274 The problems of line-drawing and judicial subjectivity
respecting criminal punishment are not qualitatively greater than respecting punitive
damages and fines.27
In terms of the gravity of the individual interest at stake and the ability of those
adversely affected to protect their interests through political processes, the rationale
for proportionality review is much stronger respecting criminal punishments than
civil punitive damages. 276 The high awards that have been the greatest source of
273
274

275

276

Karlan, supra note 12, at 920.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S; 321, 337 (1997).
See infra note 277.
Gershowitz,supra note 12, at 1291-1301; Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Deathis Different,"

Is Money Different? CriminalPunishments,Forfeitures,andPunitiveDamages- Shiing
ConstitutionalParadigmsfor Assessing Proportionality,12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217
(2003). In an engaging article, Professor Karlan cites several reasons

why proportionality review is relatively more attractive in punitive
damages cases. First, the Court may perceive the existence of more
objective indicia of excessiveness in the punitive damages cases.
Second, the punitive damages cases may raise reverse federalism

concerns that are absent from criminal prosecutions. Third, the Supreme
Court may think the level of federal intrusion can be better controlled
in the civil context. And finally, criminal cases may involve sufficient
oversight by politically accountable actors.
Karlan, supra note 12, at 920. These reasons do not persuasively justify the Court's
differential treatment ofpunitive damages and sentences of imprisonment. First, the "reverse
federalism" concern does not support such treatment. The argument is that because punitive
damages can punish a defendant's out-of-state conduct, they represent a form of extraterritorial regulation. Id.at 913. The objection to extraterritorial regulation, in turn, ultimately
derives from the need to prevent a State from imposing burdens on those who are not
represented in its political processes. See Jacques Le Boeuf, The Economics of Federalism
and the ProperScope of the FederalCommerce Power,31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 609-15
(1994). Even though the corporate entities that have been the subject of large punitive
damage awards might lack full formal representation in a State's political processes, they
influence those processes through lobbying, campaign contributions, and the like. As their
considerable state legislative successes attest, they have plenty of informal effective
representation. The need for a judicial check is correspondingly weak.
Professor Karlan does not consider the relative adequacy ofpolitical processes respecting
convicted and would-be offenders. Such a comparison is in order given that the issue is
whether the rationale forjudicial intervention is stronger in one or another context. Convicted

offenders typically lack formal representation and would-be offenders have formal but
ineffective representation. Without elevating form over substance, it is difficult to understand
how the need for judicial oversight of a dysfunctional political process is stronger in the
context of punitive damages.
Second, the objective indication of damage excessiveness to which Professor Karlan
appeals - the ratio'between punitive and compensatory damages - deserves little weight.
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complaint have been levied against large national and multinational corporations
such as State Farm Insurance,277 BMW,2 78 and Phillip Morris. 2 79 Due to their vastly
superior organizational and financial resources, these entities are much better able
to protect their interests in state and national political processes than are convicted
and would-be criminals. Partly as a result of such corporate entities' political clout,
curbing punitive damages is one part of the legislative agenda of one of the major
political parties.280 "A good many states have enacted statutes that place limits on the
permissible size of punitive damage awards,"28 ' and federal legislation is a realistic
possibility.282
Id.at 907. In both contexts, the issue is whether the damage award or the sentence is
proportionate to its ustifications.Compensatory damages do not bear a tight relationship to
the punitive and deterrent justifications for punitive damages, which is why prior to being
required to do so as a matter of constitutional law, some states did not require any such
relationship. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278 (Miss.
1985); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive

Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 33-34 (1990) (noting that the amount of the compensatory
damage award was one of many factors a jury was instructed to consider and that courts
generally set aside only those awards shocking to the conscience). Thus, the compensatory
damage award is objective in the sense that it is not chosen by the Justices, but it sheds little
information on the proportionality question. Similar objective information is available in the

criminal context. For instance, the offender's age is "objective" in the same sense and it
possesses a loose relationship to the deterrent, incapacitative, and retributive purposes of the
sentence.
Third, the argument that punitive damages are awarded by politically unaccountable
jurors ignores that jurors apply legal rules enacted by politically accountable legislators. In
many states, such rules include caps on punitive damages. See infra note 282.
277 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
278 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
279 Van Cleave, supra note 276, at 218 & n.3 (citing Boeken v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No.
BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001)).
280 See, e.g., 2000 National Republican Party Platform, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.00/#40 (last visited Nov. 30, 2005) ("We
encourage all states to consider placing caps on non-economic and punitive damages in civil
cases. We also support such caps in federal causes of action.").
281 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424,433 (2001). See also Gershowitz,
supranote 12, at 1295-97 (recounting legislative successes of business entities lobbying for
punitive damage limits).
282

In 1996, Congress passed, but President Clinton vetoed, legislation that would have

limited punitive damage awards in products liability cases. Linda Babcock &Greg Pogarsky,
Damage Caps and Settlement: A BehavioralApproach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341,344 (1999).
President Bush has advocated limits on punitive damages throughout his Presidency. For
instance, in January 2005, President Bush called on Congress to enact legislation limiting the

recoverability of punitive damages in medical malpractice actions. See Press Release, White
House, Legal Reform: The High Cost of Lawsuit Abuse (Jan. 5,2005), http://www. whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050105-2.html; see also Press Release, White House, The
President's Framework for Improving the Medical Liability System (Apr. 29, 2003), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicalliability/pg2.html.
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If countermajoritarian judicial review is warranted respecting the size of punitive damage awards, then such review is certainly owing to criminal punishments.
c. Adequacy ofpoliticalprocesses
Like the rights of speech and equal protection, the right against cruel and
unusual punishment protects the politically unpopular. The danger that political
processes will systemically discount the interests of those the right protects is arguably greater than in just about any other constitutional context, as the widespread
and appalling prison conditions that existed before judicial intervention indicate.
It consequently makes little sense to have a baseline built on trust that majoritarian
political processes almost always will safeguard the underlying constitutional values.
Political process theory helps explain why majoritarian political processes
cannot routinely be relied upon to safeguard offenders' interest in humane treatment.283 John Hart Ely's now classic book, Democracy and Distrust,284 constitutes
the leading statement of political process theory.285 According to Ely, the Court's
role in interpreting the Constitution's ambiguous individual rights is to perfect democratic processes rather than to impose substantive values. 286 Perhaps this role's
most important aspect is to shield "discrete and insular minorities" 287 from governmental action that fails to accord proper respect to their interests. Although societal
groups such as optometrists 28 and florists have minority status, they can protect
their interests in the "pluralist's bazaar 289 of majoritarian political processes by
forming coalitions with other groups. By contrast, discrete and insular minorities
lack the same ability. The problem is more fundamental than their loss of any particular political battle. As the targets of prejudice, outcast minority groups are
spumed as potential coalition partners. Political processes consequently deny them
a fair opportunity to influence outcomes and protect their interests. Ely argues that
the Court should employ heightened scrutiny in evaluating governmental action that
has a disproportionate adverse effect on such pariah groups. 29
See Frase, supra note 12, at 648 & n.323. Many scholars have made the point that
"[c]riminal defendants are precisely the sort of powerless and despised subgroup who will
not be adequately protected through democratic political processes." Id.
283

284 JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW (1980).
285 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,112 HARv. L. REv. 747,779 (1999) (describing

Ely's book as "a modem classic" that is "perhaps the most widely read work of constitutional
law of the last three decades").
286 ELY, supra note 284, at 73-104.
287

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).

288

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see also ELY, supra

note 284, at 155.
289

290

ELY, supra note 284, at 152.
Id. at 145-72.
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It is easy to see how, on Ely's account, those convicted of crime qualify as a
"discrete and insular minority."29 ' Although as an historical matter African Americans
constitute the archetypal "discrete and insular" minority, Ely thought that other groups
could also qualify.292 In most states, those convicted of serious felonies are disabled
from voting.293 In addition to such formal political exclusion, which would justify
skeptical judicial review of prison conditions and recidivist statutes, the stigma that
surrounds criminal conviction inhibits potential targets of criminal punishment from
forming interest groups. While some interest groups exist to oppose criminalization
of such controversial activities as abortion, unrestricted firearm possession, gambling,
and medical use ofmarijuana, there is no National Association ofBurglars pushing for
more respectful treatment of its members. Even if such groups did exist, mainstream
interest groups would be loathe to ally with such disreputable partners. Accordingly,
political process theory would distrust the ability of majoritarian political processes
to accord due weight to interests of convicted criminals.
Lawmakers face an asymmetrical calculus. In considering measures that expand
criminal liability or increase punishment, they are not confronted with many of the
normal incentives to take account of the interests of those who are adversely
affected. On the other side of the ledger, legislators who take a harshly anti-crime
posture can reap political benefits and avoid the political cost of being tarred as "soft
on crime."294 The legislative process, accordingly, tends to be more responsive to
prosecutorial and victim interest groups than these groups' ability to generate political
contributions or mobilize voters would suggest. The result is a political process that
systemically slights the interests of accused and convicted offenders.
The point is not that the interests of convicted offenders deserve parity with
those of law abiding citizens. On one reasonable view, those who have committed
criminal offenses have forfeited their right to have their interests count equally.
However, as the very existence of the Eighth Amendment attests, offenders have not
entirely forfeited their rights to be treated as persons. Their interests merit some
decent weight, which, as political process theory explains, ordinary political processes
See id. at 97 (discussing the Eighth Amendment).
Id. at 148-49 (discussing various groups which have been considered minorities); see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in AuthoritarianInstitutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 441,459 (1999) ("Those in the military, in prisons, and in schools are classic examples
ofdiscrete and insular minorities, who have little political power."). As mentioned in the text
ofthis article, would-be convicts, while not formally excluded, generally do not form interest
groups and would lack clout if they did.
293 See supra note 65. Consequently, those who are adversely affected by recidividist
statutes such as California's three-strikes law and by prison conditions formally lack representation in the political process.
294 See TONRY, supra note 132, at 3-4, 8, 15; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
315 (2001) (referring to "the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular
than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime").
29
292
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cannot be relied upon to provide as a matter of course. This asymmetrical political
dynamic at work can manifest itself in a number of ways, which create a framework
for understanding the formerly widespread existence of inhumane prison conditions,
the increasing use of harsh mandatory minimum sentences, and the existence of
recidivist statutes having some unjustifiably draconian applications.29 5
First, criminal legislation is particularly susceptible to the problem of'"excessive
generality,"296 with legislatures lumping quite different kinds of conduct together.297
When representative processes function effectively and affected groups can protect
their interests, legislation tends to become quite discriminating. The federal tax code
with its prolix provisions and exceptions furnishes an obvious example. In contrast,
when impediments exist to the formation of interest groups and to their ability to
form coalitions, legislation can become overly general. In a country in which death
is not a mandatory punishment for murder and few are actually executed, a preFurmanstatute making all murderers eligible for death exemplifies excessive generality. This is similar to many strict liability offenses, which lump together persons
having widely divergent levels of culpability.298 Still another example is mandatory
minimum sentences, which preclude mitigating circumstances from affecting the
sentence and which "[e]very American state during the 1970s and 1980s adopted...
for drug crimes. ' 2"
Second, overreliance on the utilitarian goals of deterrence and incapacitation also
results from the asymmetrical political process sketched above. A central tenet of the
"Between 1993 and 1995, twenty-four States and the Federal Government enacted
three strikes laws." Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2002) (plurality opinion). Some
of these statutes permit extreme results. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
(two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for triggering theft offense worth
approximately $150 and several prior theft offenses); Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (plurality opinion)
(twenty-five years to life for triggering offense of theft of $1,197 and four prior serious
violent felonies); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279-83 (1983) (life sentence for seven
nonviolent offenses); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (life sentence for three property
offenses together involving approximately $230).
295

296 David L. Shapiro, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: 4 Fiftieth Anniversary
Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 1885 (1999) (opinion of Cass Sunstein).
297 Professor Sunstein explains that the excessive generality arises "when broad terms are
applied to situations for which they could not possibly have been designed and in which they
make no sense." Id.See also David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, andEqualProtection,47
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1296-98 (1995) (providing another particularly striking example of the
same political dynamic).
298 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating law making
addiction an offense even for actors bearing no culpability for their addiction).
299 TONRY, supra note 132, at 81. See also Frase, supra note 12, at 641 ("[I]t is quite
possible that many of these offenders deserve the mandatory penalty, but it is very unlikely
that every eligible offender does."). The political process that led to adoption of California's
three-strikes law suggests the problem of excessive generality. See Karlan, supra note 12,
at 892.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:475

criminal justice system is that the deterrent effect of any punishment increases along
with its severity. Absent political checks that help assure that the interests of the
convicted receive some weight, lawmakers can increase punishment's severity in the
interests of deterrence or incapacitation without effective constraint. Public choice
theory would predict that even the cost of punitive measures, which are diffusely
dispersed among taxpayers, will prove an ineffective check.3"' The diminishing returns of punishment do not matter. The expectation of any marginal return in terms
of deterrence or incapacitation will suffice. The result is a climate in which recidivist
statutes and mandatory minimums thrive, and, more generally, there is a tendency for
"criminal law [to] come to be a one-way ratchet"' 0' of harsher punishment.
Third, lawmakers tend to skimp on the resources devoted to accused and convicted offenders since burdens may be shifted onto them largely without political
cost. Prison funding furnishes the most obvious example of this phenomenon.3 2
Legislatures also may eliminate or relax culpability requirements or defenses on
grounds of cost-saving and efficiency.3 3
Finally, the political dynamic at work can also result in the phenomenon of
desuetude. Professor Stuntz explains: "The same factors that make it hard for interest
groups to organize in opposition to new criminal legislation also make it hard to organize in support of narrowing or repealing existing statutes. The result is that once
crimes are in place, they tend to be permanent. '
Political process theory puts these various problems into a larger context,
explaining how they stem from a political process that systemically undervalues
offenders' interests. Citizens naturally recoil at grotesque punishments. There is no
contemporary constituency for amputation or the rack. But in a political process in
which offender interests are unduly discounted, cruel punishments can result from
inattention. Just as political process theory furnishes ajustification for judicial review
of state and federal measures having a disproportionate adverse effect on aliens and
other groups that are formally or effectively disenfranchised, it also supports review
of criminal punishments capable of redressing extreme manifestations of excessive
generality, over pursuit of deterrence and incapacitation, inadequate funding, and
desuetude.

" According to public choice theorists, the legislative process is insensitive to diffuse
costs spread among large numbers of typically unorganized groups such as taxpayers. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications ofPublic Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REv. 275, 285-91 (1988). A lawmaker is likely to
weigh the political benefits of taking a strong symbolic anti-crime posture against future
fiscal costs that are unlikely to produce any political backlash.
30 Stuntz, supra note 132, at 509.
302 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
303 Stuntz, supra note 132, at 519-20.
'04 Id. at 556.
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D. Summary

All three of the approaches discussed above could improve the law's coherence.
But measured against originalist and contemporary considerations alike, they imply
too narrow a judicial role. Justice Scalia's approach would effectively drain the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of contemporary meaning. The textualist and
majoritarian approaches tie the meaning of cruel and unusual punishments to the
outcome of political processes, which warrant frequent skepticism, not invariable
trust. The Court's active role in interpreting other constitutional civil liberties, the
gravity of the individual liberty interests at stake, and the inadequacy ofmajoritarian
political processes argue for meaningful judicial review that does more than merely
impose prevailing punishment practices on renegades.
III. A PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING

This Part proposes an understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
rooted in a nonutilitarian respect for individual worth. In brief, it reads the Eighth
Amendment as prohibiting punishments that are not reasonably regarded as justly
deserved, including grossly disproportionate punishments. The sections below identify and defend this understanding's general characteristics and then explore how abolition of the insanity defense, strict liability, and death for juveniles would be analyzed
under it.
A. General Characteristics
The proposal here puts the notion of cruelty at the very center of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. The historical evidence is admittedly thin, but the
Founders used the phrases "cruel and unusual punishment," "cruel or unusual punishments," and "cruel punishments" interchangeably to refer to a unitary concept. 30 5 It
keeps faith with this historical evidence to organize that concept around the term common to all three formulations. Reading the Eighth Amendment to prohibit cruel punishments also comports with contemporary notions ofjustice. The modem understanding holds that a punishment that involves the gratuitous infliction of suffering is
always unacceptable, even, and sometimes especially, when it is regularly employed." 6
What, then, is a "cruel" punishment? The Court has correctly defined it as punishment that inflicts suffering without good reason. 3 7 This simple statement brushes over
a number of more specific features, which flow from Part I's and Part I's analyses and
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See supra Part II.A.
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Id.
See supra note 4.

307

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:475

which give the concept offered here meaningful content. Some of these features are
roughly consistent with the Court's cases while others diverge from them.
1. Objective Reality and Culpability
An adequate definition of "cruel" punishment must focus on both punishment's
objective effects and the punisher's culpability.30 8 Imagine for a moment that the
focus is solely on objective effects. On this view, a punishment is "cruel" and,
hence, unconstitutional if it does not promote a legitimate penological objective in
point of fact. It does not matter that the punisher believes, even reasonably so, that
the punishment has redeeming value. There is something important to be said in
favor of such a reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Whether a
punishment mistakenly believed to promote a valid penological objective is "cruel"
depends on whose perspective is taken. From the standpoint of the punished, such
a punishment is "cruel." Given that the Clause is an individual rights provision
concerned with protecting the punished, it might reasonably be argued that the focus
properly belongs on the punished, not the punisher.
The disqualifying problem with an exclusive focus on objective effects is that
it does not give the punisher the decisionmaking space that federalism and the separation of powers require. Such a reading would consecrate the Court as a crime
control commission charged with making binding judgments concerning the wisdom
ofthis or that punishment. Suchjudgments are very frequently a matter ofreasonable
and legitimate disagreement, particularly insofar as they involve punishment's future
effects. 3" They ought to be freely revisable in light of new evidence rather than
The conceptual tools of the criminal law are useful here. The criminal law distinguishes
among act, mens rea, and attendant circumstance elements of offenses. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.13(9) (1962). Mens rea elements concern the offender's degree of culpability,
which most criminal offenses define in terms of the offender's subjective state of mind, such
as intent. Id.§ 1.13(9)(b). Attendant circumstance elements require the existence of a
specified state of affairs and do not depend on the offender's state of mind. Id.§ 1.13(9)(c-d).
An actor who sells talcum powder in the belief that it is cocaine has the mens rea needed to
make her guilty of the offense of knowingly distributing cocaine. But the attendant circumstance element requiring that the actor sell cocaine rather than some other substance is not
satisfied. The actor may be guilty of an attempt to commit the offense but not of the offense
itself. Alternatively, an actor who sells cocaine in the firm belief that it is talcum powder
would lack the mens rea the offense requires. She would not be guilty of the offense even
though the substance she has sold is cocaine, satisfying that attendant circumstance element
of the offense.
In this context, the attendant circumstance element concerns whether punishment
promotes a legitimate penological goal as a matter ofobjective reality. The mens rea element
involves whether those authorizing or inflicting the punishment are culpably wrong in believing that punishment promotes a legitimate goal.
" See supra Part I.A. 1; infra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
30'
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ossified into constitutional law. This analysis follows and makes explicit the Court's
approach. The Court has repeatedly recognized that the separation of powers requires that contestable judgments about efficacious punishment be left to legislatures
and crime control commissions, rather than to the Court itself.3 10 Sometimes
explicitly and other times implicitly, it has required the punisher to possess culpability respecting a punishment's lack of redeeming value. As a general matter, the
objective reasonableness standard the Justices embraced in Ewing strikes the appropriate balance between respecting the decisional discretion of legislatures and other
actors, on the one hand, and avoiding intrusive state-of-mind inquiries and imposing
insurmountable evidentiary burdens, on the other. 3"
While the assessment of "cruelty" must focus on the punisher's culpability, it
should also consider objective effects. In rare cases, a punishment promotes legitimate objectives even though a sadistic punisher has inflicted suffering for its own
sake.3" 2 If the focus is solely on the punisher's state of mind, such a punishment
would be "cruel." This would implausibly read the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause to prohibit attempted cruelty.
The best understanding of the text would insist that a "cruel" punishment satisfy
two conditions. First, as a matter of objective reality, it must promote no legitimate
penological objective and therefore involve the gratuitous infliction of suffering.
Second, the punisher must be culpable respecting the punishment's cruel nature.
Such culpability generally exists when the punisher has acted either sadistically,
recklessly, or negligently respecting the punishment's lack ofjustifying effects.3" 3
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The long-standing and still raging debate over the validity of the deterrence justification for penal sanctions has not reached any sufficiently
clear conclusions to permit it to be said that such sanctions are ineffective in any particular context or for any particular group of people
who are able to appreciate the consequences of their acts.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968) (plurality opinion). But see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[U]nverifiable possibilities are an
insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the threat of death today has any greater
deterrent efficacy than the threat of imprisonment.").
311 See suprd notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
312 For instance, a sadistic judge might add years onto an offender's sentence merely to
see him suffer, but, due to the case's widespread publicity, the sentence nonetheless carries
a quite significant deterrent impact.
313 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)
(plurality
opinion). In addition to giving legislative and executive officials the decisionmaking discretion that federalism and the separation of powers require, a state of mind requirement is
sometimes also necessary to screen out wholly accidental inflictions of pain, such as an unforeseeable fire, that do not qualify as punishment. See id. (finding a second attempt at electrocution not to violate Eighth Amendment since failure of initial execution attempt was "an
unforeseeable accident" and "[t]here [was] no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any
unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.").
310
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2. Proportionality
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause contains a principle of proportionality. Such a principle finds compelling support both in history and in contemporary
rationales for judicial review. A punishment may be "cruel" if it is grossly excessive
in relation to the offense of conviction, not just "always and everywhere 314 cruel for
all offenses. The Court's death penalty cases can be fairly criticized for their innovations respecting their methods of implementing proportionality, but they rightly
have proportionality as a constitutional aim. In its recent decisions concerning sentences of imprisonment, the Court has been wrong to sap proportionality of all practical meaning.
3. Retributive vs. Utilitarian Limits
The proposal here diverges from the Court's recent cases by limiting the reasons
that may justify punishment. The Court has accepted any penological objective as
a sufficient basis for concluding that punishment is not gratuitous." 5 In contrast, the
view offered here would prohibit harsh punishment from finding its justification
solely in utilitarian objectives such as general deterrence and incapacitation. It instead would require that punishment be supported by the retributive objective of
giving an offender his just deserts. Two interrelated considerations support this view's
adoption.
a. The unenforceabilityof utilitarianlimits

The first consideration is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause becomes
irrelevant if utilitarian rationales may suffice. As we have seen, all of the punishments the Court has invalidated can be reasonably viewed as furthering utilitarian
objectives of deterrence or incapacitation. These include a seldom-used death
penalty, a hitching post for disobedient inmates, death for the retarded, and even
torture and the rack.3" 6 Large increases in punishment severity can be defended as
necessary to incapacitate offenders who would otherwise inflict very serious harm or
to create sufficient disincentives to commit offenses having low clearance rates.
Even if large increases in severity produce only modest gains, their utilitarian value is
magnified by the gravity of the offenses prevented. To conclude that punishment is
excessive in relation to utilitarian objectives, the Court would have to constitutionalize
its own contestable judgments regarding punishment's future costs, deterrent effects,

314

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987 (plurality opinion).

315See supranote 23-28 and accompanying text.
316

See supra Part I.A.1; supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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and incapacitative benefits. It would thereby deny legislatures and other decisionmakers the decisional authority federalism and the separation of powers necessitate.
A recent article by Professor Frase illustrates the dilemma." 7 He begins by
accepting the Court's declaration that any penological objective, including a utilitarian one, may furnish a constitutionally adequate justification." 8 Proportionality
retains meaning, he contends, because a punishment may be unconstitutionally
excessive relative to utilitarian objectives." 9 This may be so either because the punishment's costs exceed its deterrent or incapacitative benefits or because it is unnecessarily burdensome or costly compared with alternatives. 2 0 Professor Frase
suggests that the sentences inAndrade,Ewing, andSolem violate utilitarian principles
of proportionality.'
Yet the claims needed to ground these suggestions, which
necessarily appeal to punishments' future costs and effects, are hedged by such terms
as "seems," 322 "may,"323 "likely," 324 and "may be.q325 A Court having appropriate concern for federalism, the separation of powers, and judicial subjectivity will leave such
speculations to other actors.
Consider Professor Frase's analysis of Solem v. Helm,326 in which he contends
that a properly invalidated punishment was unconstitutional.327 Solem was sentenced
as a recidivist to life without parole for a triggering offense of passing a bad check
worth $ 100 and for six prior felonies involving burglary and various other nonviolent
property offenses.328 Professor Frase argues that "life without parole also seems
likely to be far more costly in human terms than the crimes it will prevent through
deterrence and incapacitation (discounted by the risk of encouraging more serious
crimes (reverse deterrence), and the long term disutility of disproportionate penalties)., 32 9 This truncated analysis, which trades far more on speculation than any
data, is quite debatable. It is reasonable to suppose that Solem was not apprehended
for every offense he committed and his past convictions understate the value of
incapacitating him. Furthermore, as the dissent noted, a number of Solem's prior
offenses carried the potential for violence so that the danger of future violence could

317 Frase,
319

supranote 12.
Id. at 574-76.
Id. at 576.

320

id.

321
322

Id. at 627-45.
Id. at 634.

323

Id.

318

324

325
326
327
328
329

Id. at 645.
Id.at 636.
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Frase, supranote 12, at 638-39.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-82.
Frase, supranote 12, at 639.
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be reasonably included in the calculus. 33" Adding the value of the offenses prevented
through Solem's incarceration to the general deterrent value of his lengthy sentence,
Solem's incarceration might well be cost-justified as a purely financial matter.
Professor Frase wishes to discount any incapacitive and deterrent benefits by the
phenomenon of "reverse deterrence."33 ' The idea is that harsh punishment can cause
offenders to kill witnesses and undermine public respect for the law. 332 But the
existence, degree, and valuation of any such "reverse deterrence" are all highly
uncertain. Professor Frase's analysis is plausible and could be correct. But to accept
such armchair empiricism as the basis for a constitutional ruling would be to
empower the Justices to determine punishments' objective effects without leaving
room for other actors to make their own reasonable determinations. This would be
a serious misreading of the Clause.
Perhaps for this reason, Professor Frase maintains that a threshold constitutional
violation exists when a prison sentence violates either retributive or utilitarian principles of proportionality. 333 If the Court is correct that any penological objective will
suffice, then punishment is constitutional unless it is excessive relative to both an
offender's just deserts and utilitarian objectives. Professor Frase's resort to retributive principles as an independent limit can be seen to recognize implicitly that, unless
the Justices inappropriately rely on consequentialist guesses beyond their purview,
utilitarian principles themselves furnish no meaningful constitutional constraint.
In contrast, retributive justice requires no judicial foray into speculative future
consequences and costs. Two primary considerations bear on an assessment of
justly deserved punishment: the degree of the harm inflicted or threatened and the
offender's culpability. These involve the nature of the offense of conviction and facts
in the record, not guesses about future consequences such as reverse deterrence. In
making assessments about the nature and degree of punishment these two considerations merit, the Justices do not operate in a vacuum. Screened for the problems of
excessive generality, overpursuit of utilitarian objectives, and desuetude, existing
practice both within and without the jurisdiction furnish objective guideposts. Some
of the Court's cases give inter-jurisdictional and intra-jurisdictional comparisons
precisely this role.334

Solem, 463 U.S. at 315-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Frase, supranote 12, at 639.
332 Id. at 595.
333Id.at 633, 643, 645.
334See, e.g.,Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94(2005); id.at 1210-12 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36, 42-47 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004--05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Solem, 463
U.S. at 290-92 (majority opinion).
330
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b. Retributive limits and the role of individualrights
Besides the need for judicially enforceable limits, a second reason supports a
constitutional requirement that punishment be within the confines of retributive
justice, reasonably construed. Such a requirement coheres with the widely accepted
role of individual rights as constraints against the use of individuals as mere means in
a grand pursuit of social welfare. Any ambitious claim that the Bill of Rights generally imposes constraints ofa nonutilitarian nature335 is well beyond this article's scope.
The narrower point here is that, whatever its force in other contexts, the notion of a
nonutilitarian constraint strongly resonates with some of the deepest elements of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
First, it can explain the Founders' categorical opposition to torture and the rack
in a way that utilitarian considerations cannot. Torture and the rack conceivably
might have great deterrent value. They are nonetheless fundamentally unacceptable
because they go substantially beyond what giving offenders their just deserts will
support. They do so by violating a key premise of retributive justice, which holds
that an individual possesses an inviolable worth and dignity that cannot be subordinated in the name of the public good.
Second, the Court has embraced this premise in its boilerplate description of the
Eighth Amendment's most basic aims. "[T]he Eighth Amendment," the Court routinely declares, "reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
'
persons."336
...See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977).
Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1190. See also id. at 1207 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 738 (2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356
336

U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); Frase, supranote 12, at 646. Foreign courts have
embraced the principle that fundamental limitations on punishment derive from a nonutilitarian
notion of human dignity. Like the Eighth Amendment, section 12 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms prohibits"cruel and unusual treatment or punishment." Part I of the

Constitution Act, 1892, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 12 (U.K.). A
majority of the Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court has declared: "General deterrence
cannot, by its own, prevent a punishment from being cruel and unusual ....
General deterrence
can support a sentence which is more severe while still within the range of punishments that

are not cruel and unusual." Morrisey v. The Queen, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, 117, availableat
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/cgi-bin/disp.pl/en/pub/2000/vol2/html/2000scr2-

0090.html. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213
U.N.T.S. 221. The European Court of Human Rights has held that a punishment does not
cease to violate the European Convention on Human Rights "just because it is believed to
be, or actually is, an effective deterrent or aid to crime control. Above all, as the Court must
emphasise, it is never permissible to have recourse to punishments which are contrary to
Article 3, whatever their deterrent effect may be." Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 15 (1978).
This holding rests on the view that fundamental limitations on punishment derive from a
nonutilitarian notion of human dignity.
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Finally, as others have observed, the Court has implicitly interpreted the
337
Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment in exclusively retributivist terms.
338 the offender pled guilty to failing to report that he
In United States v. Bajakajian,
was carrying more than $10,000 in cash as he left the United States.339 The Court
held that forfeiture of the $357,144 in his possession constituted an excessive fine
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 34' The Court noted that the Excessive Fines
Clause, by its express terms, requires that a fine be proportionate.34 ' The forfeiture
plainly was not disproportionate to the utilitarian objective of deterrence. It is
reasonable to surmise that, given the ease with which cash is concealed, very few
instances of the currency reporting offense result in conviction. In holding that the
forfeiture constituted punishment, the Court noted that deterrence "has traditionally
been viewed as a goal of punishment. 3 42 The Court, however, ignored deterrence
entirely in holding that forfeiture of the entire amount was grossly disproportionate.343 It instead focused solely on retributive considerations: the "minimal" amount
of the harm and the offender's culpability. 344 It makes little sense to require that
retributivejustice support the amount of a criminal fine but not the nature and length
of sentences.
To be sure, utilitarian objectives such as general deterrence and incapacitation
are legitimate and important. On the view urged here, they supply reasons to make
choices within a punishment range determined by a nonutilitarian notion of desert.
In light of the inherent imprecision of notions of retributive justice and the discretion
punishers have in giving them meaning, the constitutionally permissible range typically will be quite broad. This gives decisionmakers great leeway to pursue utilitarian
objectives. Contrary to the Court's current view, however, the pursuit of utilitarian
objectives has judicially enforceable limitations. Deterrence, incapacitation, and the
like cannot support harsh punishment that falls outside parameters set by individual
worth and retributive justice.
4. The Role of "Unusual"
Although a punishment's "unusual" nature may furnish relevant evidence of
cruelty, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of unconstitutionality.
...See Karlan, supra note 12, at 901-02.
338 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
339 Id.

Id. at 344.
Id. at 334-35.
342 Id. at 329.
143 Id. at 337-40. Both harm and culpability were "minimal" because the funds were
legally obtained and could have been taken out of the country with the required disclosure.
Id.In dissent, Justice Kennedy complained that the Court's holding permits fines that are
"not much of a deterrent." Id.at 354 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
340

341

344Id.
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To treat it as invariably necessary would be to eliminate the Court as a countermajoritarian check. In its prison conditions cases, the Court correctly has declined
to treat the pervasive nature of prison violence and inadequate medical care as
automatically insulating these practices from constitutional challenge.34 5 As political
process theory would predict and experience confirms, political inattention to
offenders' interests can result in inadequate funding. To address the effects of the
asymmetrical political pressures at work, a correspondingly strong need exists to
leave open the possibility ofjudicial intervention. The problems of excessive generality, overreliance on utilitarian objectives, and desuetude likewise merit judicial
attention, even, and perhaps especially, when these problems are widespread.
Just as a marked departure from prevailing penal practice should not be required
to establish a constitutional violation, neither should it automatically imply a violation.
Retributive justice is a flexible concept that imposes relatively loose constraints,
particularly in light of the decisional space created by the separation of powers and
federalism. Harsher than customary punishments still may be within the range of
constitutionally permissible punishment.
If customary practice is not determinative, then how is a punishment's constitutionality determined? On the understanding proposed here, the governing standard
is whether the punisher is unreasonable to conclude that the punishment is justly
deserved. A retributive view ofjust deserts requires that punishment be proportionate to the gravity of the offense as measured by two principal considerations: the
degree to which the offender has deprived or threatened to deprive another of her
autonomy and the offender's responsibility for the deprivation.346 Certain obvious
principles flow from these basic considerations. For instance, other things being
equal, intentional wrongdoing generally deserves harsher punishment than unintentional wrongdoing due to the offender's greater responsibility. And, other things
being equal, homicide deserves harsher punishment than other offenses, particularly
property offenses, because of the greater deprivation of the victim's autonomy.
Customary practice, though not dispositive, can guide the analysis of whether
the punisher has unreasonably concluded that the punishment is justly deserved.
The logic of just deserts yields the relative judgment that intentional homicide
merits harsher punishment than reckless aggravated battery. But logic alone cannot
dictate the absolutejudgment of how harsh the punishment for intentional homicide
ought to be. If the average sentence for intentional murder is twenty-five years imprisonment, then, under retributive precepts, the average sentence for reckless infliction

...See supra Part I.A.2.
346 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 12, at 590; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL

PSYCHOLOGY 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (explaining that retributivists "are
committed to the principle that punishment should be graded in proportion to [moral
culpability]").
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of serious bodily harm ought to be less. But should the average sentence for
intentional murder be twenty-five or fifteen years imprisonment?
The general corpus and direction of customary penal practice, which has always
been substantially driven by the perceived dictates of retributive justice, furnish a
relevant baseline. Rough-hewn judgments such as whether death ought to be the
presumptive or an exceptional punishment for murder can and do change through time
and furnish starting points for constitutional analysis. Intra- and inter-jurisdictional
comparisons can provide useful benchmarks for comparison, as many of the Justices
have recognized.347 Such benchmarks not only can be relevant indicia of accepted
notions ofjust desert but also can defuse separation of powers and federalism concerns
by incorporating deference to legislative judgments.
While customary practice, writ large, can provide a relevant baseline, the reasons
for particular practices, punishments, and sentences must be closely scrutinized. The
Court should give no weight to penal practices resulting from the problems of excessive generality, fiscal neglect, the pursuit ofutilitarian objectives, and desuetude. To
do otherwise would be to subvert the rationale for judicial review. Prison conditions
that are the byproduct of inadequate funding do not furnish reliable evidence of the
dictates of retributive justice, nor do three-strikes recidivist statutes that are defended
principally on the basis of a need for incapacitation and deterrence. Incapacitation
and deterrence can help decide how harsh punishment may be within broad limits
fixed by a retributive emphasis on just deserts. However, on the view of the Eighth
Amendment urged here, they cannot determine what those limits are.
In short, a more nuanced approach is needed. Legislative judgments should not
be relied upon to define the Eighth Amendment's meaning, as the Court's rhetoric
commands. Nor should they all be ignored as flawed products of a dysfunctional
process. Screened for the problems of undue generality, utilitarian excess, inadequate funding, and desuetude, penal custom can furnish essential evidence of what
retributive justice requires and permits.
B. ParticularApplications
To illustrate the approach outlined above, this section applies it to several
Eighth Amendment issues and contrasts it with the multiple approaches warring
with one another in the Court's cases. As with any general theory, the approach
proposed here does not necessarily generate a uniquely correct answer to every
given problem. It instead furnishes a framework for analysis. Reasonable persons
may differ over how the relevant considerations apply and the relative weight each
7 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005); id. at 1210-12
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36, 42-47 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
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should receive. This does not mean that the approach is hopelessly indeterminate.
Like other useful intellectual constructs, it produces a range of acceptable answers.
This range is often narrower than and different from that permitted by the Court's
hodgepodge of approaches.
1. Abolition of the Insanity Defense
Legislatures in five states have enacted statutes that effectively abolish the
insanity defense. 348 Under these statutes, which embrace the so-called "mens rea
model," insainity exculpates only when the accused lacks the culpability the offense
requires. For instance, a man who squeezes his wife's head in the delusional belief
that it is his hat 349 would not be guilty of battery because he does not possess the
requisite intent to inflict bodily injury. But a man who kills his wife in the delusional belief that she is about to blow up the world would be guilty of murder.
Notwithstanding his mental illness, he possesses the required intent to kill. 350 State

supreme courts have divided on whether it violates the Constitution to bar any resort
to an insanity defense in such circumstances.3 1' Eventual Supreme Court resolution
is a possibility.
The Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence allows the Justices to select
arbitrarily among lines of reasoning that will support either result. The analysis
partly involves asking whether the state statutes defy evolving standards of decency,
as evidenced by statutes in other states, judicial decisions, jury verdicts, and other
341

IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 18-207(1) (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); MONT.

CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 193 & 220 (2001); UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2003).
349 OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL

TALES (1985).
350 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 330, § 25.07(C)(1) (2d ed. 1995).
Evidence of D's mental condition would be inadmissible ... to show
that she did not realize that taking a human life is morally or legally
wrong, that she acted on the basis of an irresistible impulse to kill, or
even that she killed V because she hallucinated that Vwas about to kill
her.
Id.
31' Compare Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001) (holding that statute abolishing
insanity defense violates substantive due process), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002), and
State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910) (holding abolition of insanity defense unconstitutional), with State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003) (finding no substantive due process
or Eighth Amendment violation), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1006 (2003), State v. Herrera, 993
P.2d 854 (Utah 1999) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation), cert. denied,528 U.S. 1049
(1999), State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995) (finding no substantive due process
violation), State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993) (finding no Eighth Amendment or
substantive due process violation), cert. denied,511 U.S. 1005 (1994), and State v. Searcy,
798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990) (finding no substantive due process violation).
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objective indicia." 2 On the one hand, the mens rea model may be said to represent
merely another experimental step within a broadly defined and evolving tradition
concerning the appropriate legal response to cognitive disability. 353 The law has
been characterized by a great deal of flux, ranging from experimentation with broader
35 4
and narrower tests of insanity to alterations of the burden of proof and persuasion.
The mens rea model, it may be said, is akin to measures such as these whose consti55
tutionality the Court has affirmed.
On the other hand, the mens rea model may be characterized as a departure from
the evolving tradition on the ground that it effectively eliminates rather than merely
redefines the insanity defense.356 When someone lacks the required culpability,
insanity does not operate as a true defense. Instead, it precludes the prosecution
from establishing one of the essential elements of the offense. Furthermore, the
great bulk of cases covered by the traditional insanity defense involve persons who
possess the required mental state but, due to a grossly distorted perception of reality,
act for bizarre reasons. The constitutionality of the mens rea model, like many other
issues the Court has decided, depends on the malleable characterization of both the
rule or punishment under consideration and the evolving custom to which it relates.
Such matters of characterization are not governed by neutral standards, and it is not
clear how nonarbitrary standards could be devised.
Another strain of the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law
focuses on whether a legitimate penological objective may reasonably be attributed
to the punishment.35 7 The Justices could invoke this mode of analysis to uphold the
mens rea model. Unlike the M'Naghten test,358 for instance, the mens rea model
punishes those in the grips of mental disease who kill intentionally under the
delusional belief that the killing is in legitimate self-defense. It is not unreasonable
to suppose that such persons endanger others and therefore stand in need of
incapacitation, which the Court has recognized as a legitimate penal objective. 5

352
311

See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339-40 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bethel, 66 P.3d at 851.

314 PAUL

H.

ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES

698-706

(2005); id.at 706-09 (reprintingLisa Callahan et al., InsanityDefense Reform in the United
States - Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsABLrY L. REP. 54-60 (1987)).
115 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion) (stating in
dictum that shifting views of insanity "has always been thought to be the province of the
States"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding measure that shifted burden to
defendant, requiring that he establish insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
356 Finger,27 P.3d at 81.
151 See generally supra Part I.A. 1.
358 M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.).
...Ewingv. California, 538 U.S. 11,25(2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 999-1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 n.28 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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Alternatively, the Court could simply ignore the legitimate penal objective principle,
as it has done every time it has invalidated a punishment.36
The approach urged here involves a more coherent analysis. The outcome does
not turn on whether the mens rea model is characterized as within or without the
range of customary practice. Nor can the constitutionality of the mens rea model be
sustained simply by showing that it furthers the utilitarian objective of incapacitation. The central question instead is whether those from whom the mens rea model
withdraws an insanity defense reasonably may be said to deserve criminal punishment as a matter of justice.
The answer depends on whether such persons are capable of and exercise the
meaningful choice required to support the assignment ofblame. Psychiatric evidence
is relevant, as well as the notion of what constitutes meaningful choice. The debatable nature of this latter notion explains why the Court has been correct to recognize that the Constitution does not require adoption of a particular definition of
insanity."' On one view, culpability cannot be assigned whenever the offense is the
causal "product" of mental illness.

362

But this view, which was incorporated into the

3 63

ill-fated Durham "product test,
might reasonably be thought too broad. The
causes of any offender's conduct always can be traced back far enough to circumstances over which he had no control, including but not limited to mental disease.3 4
Accordingly some narrower definition of insanity might reasonably be adopted.
One court has properly acknowledged that the definition that best captures the
responsibility essential to the assignment of blame is a matter on which reasonable
minds may differ.365
Is the mens rea model a reasonable way of distinguishing between those who do
and do not possess responsibility? As mentioned above, the fact that only five
jurisdictions have chosen this path furnishes some relevant evidence that the ensuing
punishment is cruel in the required sense, particularly because the principal argument
for the insanity defense always has been that punishment of the insane is incompatible with moral blame and just desert.3 6
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for "conveniently ignor[ing] a third 'social purpose' of the death penalty 'incapacitation' (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28 (plurality opinion))).
361 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
360

797-99 (1952).
362

363

Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 874-76.

" Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:Recasting The Role of MentalDisabilityin
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1222 (2000).

United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
I" DREssLER, supra note 350, at 315, § 25.03[B] ("Although utilitarian arguments are
sometimes posited in support of the insanity defense, the underlying rationale of the defense
365

is primarily retributive in nature.");

WAYNE

R. LAFAvE,

CRIMINAL LAW

326, § 4.1 (c)(6) (3d

ed. 2000) ("[T]he insanity defense developed as a means of saving from retributive
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But custom is by no means sufficient to support this conclusion. The reasons
for the mens rea innovation must be carefully examined. For instance, suppose that
the mens rea model has been adopted in response to the wide availability of
efficacious psychiatric medication and treatment. Harmful acts could be laid at the
doorstep of a failure to accept or continue treatment and this failure in turn justly
could be characterized as willful. In this way, untreated mental illness would
resemble voluntary intoxication, which in most states is often not a defense even
when it causes the offender to lack the culpability an offense requires.367 This supposition is counterfactual: changes in the availability and efficacy of treatment did
not form the basis for the move to the mens rea model.
The impetus for the mens rea model instead came from frustration over the
difficulties of formulating an insanity test and from a perception that confused juries
have been misapplying it.368 Such concerns would support more closely screening
the admissibility and content of expert testimony as well as shifting the burden of
persuasion. However, they furnish no basis for a categorical conclusion that all who
kill intentionally, even those in the grips of a delusional belief they are saving the
world from imminent destruction, possess the degree of choice and responsibility
needed to support the assignment of blame. Such an overbroad and undiscriminating judgment can be seen to suffer from the problem of excessive generality, which
results from a political process that unduly discounts offenders' interests and which
merits a judicial check.
Even according legislatures due latitude to make reasonable empirical and moral
judgments, the mens rea model thus violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. This is not simply because it departs from custom, although custom turns
out to be highly relevant in this context due to both the insanity defense's retributive
justification and the purely utilitarian reasons for eliminating it. Custom points to
and reinforces a conclusion that the mens rea model punishes some persons who, on
any reasonable view, do not justly deserve it. The model dispenses with the responsibility needed to ground blame for utilitarian reasons of efficiency.
2. Strict Liability
At first blush, it would seem that the Court's approach would always permit the
use of strict liability and that the approach urged here never would. While these conclusions capture the general thrust of each approach, they overlook the inconsistencies that inhere in the Court's approach and oversimplify the one proposed here.
punishment those individuals who were so different from others that they could not be
blamed for what they had done.").
367 Mitchell Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense,
87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 482, 518-19 (1997).
368 State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840,845 (Kan. 2003); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66,76-78 (Nev.
2001) (citing confusion and financial cost as the legislative rationales for Nevada's statute).
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Strong currents in the Court's approach lead to the conclusion that the use of
strict liability is always tolerable.369 So-called public welfare offenses are not so
uncommon that they may be said to defy evolving standards of decency.3 7 ° Even
some serious offenses such as felony murder and statutory rape require no
culpability respecting elements that trigger marked increases in punishment.3 7' In
addition, strict liability bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate penological
objective of deterrence. It is not irrational to believe that strict liability has a deterrent impact by increasing conviction rates and by inducing persons to exercise a
higher degree of care. It is true that the Court has sometimes ignored the principle
relied upon in Ewing that a punishment is constitutional if reasonably related to
deterrence or incapacitation and that strict liability can produce punishment that is
disproportionate to culpability. 372 However, outside of the death penalty context, the
Court has declined to give teeth to the general theoretical prohibition against grossly
disproportionate punishments.
The Court's chaotic jurisprudence nonetheless furnishes some basis for holding
some strict liability offenses unconstitutional. The characterization of customary
practice is malleable. With creative counting, perhaps a consensus can be manufactured against the use of strict liability for serious offenses carrying lengthy sentences.373 The nearly universal acceptance of felony murder and the majority treatment of statutory rape would seem to undercut such a conclusion. However, perhaps
these offenses can be distinguished.374
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) ("Courts have turned to
construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it
and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime.").
370 There has been "a legislative trend in the twentieth century to omit mens rea from a
369

growing list of crimes." Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, andthe
Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 327 (2003). For the seminal judicial

and scholarly treatment, see Morissette,342 U.S. at 252-62; Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
371MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1, pt. II cmt. at 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980) (describing the felony murder rule as "a form of strict liability"); Carpenter, supranote
370, at 385-91 (indicating that thirty jurisdictions treat statutory rape as a strict liability
offense).
372 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (plurality opinion).
313 The Court's opinion in Staples v. UnitedStates, 511 U.S. 600,616-19 (1994), flirts with
this idea: "Close adherence to [earlier cases] ...might suggest that punishing a violation as
a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense." Id.at 618.
37'Felony murder conceivably can be excluded from the universe of "strict liability"
offenses on the ground that it does require culpability, namely that needed to make the
offender guilty of the underlying felony. JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL LAW
418 (5th ed. 2003) (stating that felony murder requires guilt ofa felony). Statutory rape might
be distinguished on the ground that having sexual relations with the young is inherently risky
and that the use of strict liability in the context of dangerous activities, such as the use of
explosives, has a long pedigree. Carpenter, supranote 370, at 361-71; see also Staples, 511
U.S. at 608-15; id.at 628-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The approach here, which insists upon reasonable grounds for believing that
punishment is justly deserved, would seem to imply the automatic unconstitutionality of strict liability. This conclusion might be thought to necessitate too great a
departure from the results of the Court's cases and from existing practice. Consequently, some might reject the proposed approach as producing unacceptable results.
In fact, a more sophisticated analysis is required, and its end point is not always
the unconstitutionality of strict liability offenses. First, as Professor Kelman has argued,
at least some strict liability offenses can be viewed as requiring negligence.375 Instead
of defining negligence through an open-ended reasonable prudence standard, which
is subject to the vagaries of case-by-case application by juries, strict liability uses the
vehicle of particularized rules established by the legislature.376 For instance, consider
an offense that criminalizes the sale of adulterated milk regardless of whether the seller
knew or had reason to know of the adulteration. On Kelman's view, such an offense
may be viewed as decreeing that it is negligent not to take precautions to learn whether
milk has spoiled.377 Perhaps Kelman's view is ultimately unpersuasive or applies only
to some strict liability offenses, but its appeal indicates that the approach here does not
automatically imply the unconstitutionality of all strict liability offenses.
Second, instead of eliminating culpability, strict liability offenses can be seen
as reallocating authority to determine culpability from juries to sentencing judges.
Culpability remains relevant to punishment even when a jury need not find its existence as an element of the offense. A judge who determines that the offender genuinely lacked culpability might impose such a light sanction that it does not rise to the
level of "punishment" and therefore does not implicate the Eighth Amendment at all.
A harsher sanction might be merited by the degree of the offender's culpability, as
determined by the sentencing judge. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial undoubtedly constrains the allocation of authority between judges and juries.378 But, as
the Court's cases reflect, the answers to complex jury-judge allocation issues do not
derive from the Eighth Amendment. In upholding particular punishments against
Eighth Amendment challenges, the Justices have relied on facts pertaining to the
offender's culpability that were not part of the elements of the offense but were rather
3 79
part of the overall factual story available for consideration at sentencing.
Despite the above caveats, the proposal here would cast a suspicious eye on
strict liability offenses for two reasons. First, this proposal is premised on the notion
...Mark Kelman, Strict Liability:An Unorthodox View, in 4
AND JUSTICE

Id.
311Id. at

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME

1512, 1513 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).

376

1517-18.
E.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000).
379Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,38-40 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 296-97 & n.22 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372 n.1 (1982) (per
curiam).
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that the Constitution prohibits criminal punishment in the absence of a reasonable
basis for believing that it is warranted by harm and fault. Second, strict liability
offenses often involve problems characteristic of the political process's insensitivity
to offenders' interests. They can involve the phenomenon of excessive generality
by encompassing persons of greatly varying levels of culpability. They also can reflect an undue privileging of utilitarian objectives. By eliminating requirements of
fault, legislatures seek to avoid the financial costs and loss of convictions that flow
from the necessity of persuading a jury of fault beyond a reasonable doubt.
In short, this article's approach would not render all applications of all strict liability offenses unconstitutional. It is open to the idea that some strict liability offenses
reasonably can be viewed as simultaneously requiring negligence and defining with
particularity what negligence means in a given context. And it does not foreclose
shifting authority to find the culpability needed to justify punishment from juries to
sentencing judges. It nonetheless would regard such claimedjustifications with skepticism, and it rejects those features of the Court's jurisprudence that allow criminal
punishment to be imposed without fault in the name of efficiency.
3. Death for Juveniles
In Roper v. Simmons,38 the Court held that it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment to execute persons who are younger than eighteen when they commit
their offense.18 ' Writing for a narrow five Justice majority, Justice Kennedy found
support for this result in, inter alia, the number of States opposed to executing such
persons and an independent assessment of the underlying moral considerations.3 2
As evidence of a "national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles, 383 the
Court counted thirty States as prohibiting it.38 4 This number, the Court reported,
"compris[es] 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain
it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its
reach., 385 In dissent, Justice Scalia objected to the inclusion of States that do not
have a death penalty3 86 and, with characteristic passion, declared that "[w]ords have
no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a
national consensus., 387 Both the majority and the dissent's use of legislation furnish
an illuminating contrast with the role of penal custom under the theory advanced
here.
380

125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1218.
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Among the twenty States Justice Scalia counted as permitting the execution of
persons below the age of eighteen, he included thirteen whose death penalty statutes
contain no minimum age.3 8 Absent legislative history indicating otherwise, these
statutes do not reflect any considered judgment that the deathpenalty ought to reach
those below the age of eighteen.38 9 It is entirely possible that the legislators simply
did not focus on this particular issue and that the absence of a specific provision
exemplifies the problem of excessive generality. 39° Persons below the age of eighteen
cannot vote, thereby removing even this generally weak incentive for legislators to
consider affected offenders' interests and strengthening the suspicion of excessive
generality. Only the thirteen statutes that expressly authorize death for offenders
below the age of eighteen may be said with confidence to incorporate a deliberate
judgment that death may be proportionate punishment in such circumstances. 9
The Court, too, overstated the legislative support for its preferred result. In
addition to the eighteen states whose death penalty statutes expressly apply only to
those eighteen years of age and older, the Court's count included the twelve States
that do not have a death penalty.392 The issue at hand is whether juveniles younger
than eighteen may belong in the subclass of murderers who deserve death as a
matter ofjustice. Justice Scalia exaggerated matters to say definitively that a State's
rejection of the death penalty "sheds no light whatever on the point at issue., 393 A
judgment that no one deserves death also implies that the juveniles do not deserve
death. But there are many utilitarian reasons to oppose the death penalty that have
nothing to do with desert. For instance, a decision to forego the death penalty on
grounds of cost does not suggest, much less imply, that no one below the age of
eighteen deserves death as a matter of retributive justice.
Furthermore, the issue may reasonably be framed not as whether juveniles
deserve death but rather as whether juveniles deserve death given the legitimacy of
the death penalty. One possibility is that a given non-death state subjects those
38

Id. In the absence of any specific provision respecting the death penalty, the State's

general provisions concerning whether a juvenile may be tried as an adult apply. "Almost
every State, and the Federal Government, has set a minimum age at which juveniles accused
of committing serious crimes can be waived from juvenile court into criminal court."

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion).
389 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1210 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361,385 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826 (plurality opinion); id.
at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
391See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(refusing to permit execution of an offender below the age of sixteen because Oklahoma
death statute did not explicitly authorize this result).
9 See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1219.
3 Id.at 1192; see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(counting non-death states as part of a consensus against executing those below the age of
sixteen).

39'Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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below the age of eighteen to its most serious available punishment, such as life
without parole. It does not follow that such a state would wish to subject offenders
younger than eighteen to the qualitatively more severe punishment of death. Alternatively, a non-death state may categorically exempt those below eighteen from the
most serious available punishment. Although this decision does imply a presumptive desire to shield juveniles from death, the Court made no effort to show that all,
most, or any of the non-death states fall into this category.
As this discussion reveals, the Court's supposed reliance on prevailing penal
practice amounts to a kind of parlor counting game. Justices in the majority and
dissent frame the issue in a manner designed to produce the desired outcome. States
are tallied up largely without regard to the reasons underlying their enactments and
without regard to political dynamics that merit suspicion rather than deference.
Contrary to the claims of the majority and Justice Scalia's dissent, not all fifty states
have addressed whether death is a categorically disproportionate punishment for
those below eighteen. Based upon the information contained in the Justices' various
opinions, only thirty-one can be relied upon to have done so." Of these, eighteen
apparently have concluded that death is categorically disproportionate, and thirteen
that it is not.395 Whether the former states are characterized as 60 percent of the States
to have addressed the issue or 36 percent of all states, these figures do not amount to
a societal consensus in favor of a categorical ban. In their dissents, Justices Scalia and
O'Connor were right to treat the Court's professed discovery of such a consensus as
a pretense.396
Pretense aside, what is the relevance ofprevailing practice in this context? It can
be said that more states than not have concluded that death is a categorically disproportionate punishment for juveniles. This furnishes some support for a conclusion
of unconstitutionality in light of the political dynamics of crime,397 including here the
inability of juveniles to vote. But it neither evidences a societal consensus, as the
Court pretended, nor compels a constitutional conclusion that death is categorically
disproportionate. Nor does it require a conclusion that death sometimes may be
constitutionally imposed. Justice Scalia's view that societal consensus is a necessary
condition of unconstitutionality is insensitive to the reasons to treat political outcomes with suspicion. It is also true that prosecutors seek and jurors impose death
relatively infrequently on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. 39' But absent more
information about the relevant pool of cases it is impossible to know whether this
394Id.at 1219.

'9'Id.
at 1185.
396 See id.at 1211 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]bjective evidence of a national
consensus is weaker than in most prior cases in which the Court has struck down a particular
punishment."); id.
at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Court's claim of a
national consensus rests upon "the flimsiest of grounds").
197 Id.at 1193.
398 Id.at 1192.
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reflects arbitrariness and disproportionality, on the one hand, or that the few
deserving juveniles are being appropriately singled out, on the other.
One feature of prevailing practice that may be relied upon as having constitutional significance is the widely shared judgment that not every murderer deserves
death. This judgment is so deeply entrenched that it may be properly relied upon
as a constitutional baseline of justly deserved punishment. In the modem world,
death is a proportionate punishment only if it is imposed on the "worst of the worst,"
on the subcategory of murderers who deserve the harshest punishment as a matter
of justice.
The issue in Roper was whether proportionality requires a categorical ban
against the execution of those who were sixteen or seventeen when they committed
their offense.399 The answer depends on the approach used to implement the constitutional requirement of proportionality. The most direct approach is the one which
Justice O'Connor employed and which the Court uses in cases involving punishments other than death. It focuses on the particular rule or punishment at stake and,
to give considerations of federalism and separation of powers their due, asks
whether the rule or punishment reasonably may be believed to be proportionate. 400
Of course, the proposal here would modify this approach to inquire whether the punishment reasonably may be believed proportionate as a matter of retributive justice.
On this standard, no categorical ban should be required. As Justice O'Connor
argued persuasively in her dissent, a state may reasonably conclude that death is a
proportionate punishment for at least some juvenile offenders."1 It makes little
sense to conclude that a state may reasonably believe that a murderer who is eighteen
years and a day old sometimes merits death but may never so conclude respecting
a juvenile who is seventeen years and 364 days old.
In its death penalty cases, however, the Court has used a different and more
aggressive approach to implement the constitutional command of proportionality.
It has required legislatures to specify aggravating circumstances limiting the class
of murderers eligible for death, 2 directed courts to allow juries to hear and consider
all relevant mitigating evidence,40 3 and precluded death as a punishment for certain
offenses such as rape' and for certain classes of offenders such as the retarded.4 5
199
Id.
at 1187.
41 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-21 (2003).
401 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority acknowledged but
was unwilling to concede this point. Id.at 1197 (majority opinion) ("Certainly it can be
argued, although we by no means concede the point, that a rare case might arise in which a
juvenile offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates
sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death.").
402 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (decrying spotty application of the death
penalty and requiring those eligible for it to be clearly defined).
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164 (1976).
0 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
405

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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This approach is imprecise and prophylactic by nature. For instance, the requirement that legislatures specify aggravating circumstances works imperfectly in identifying the most culpable murderers. The list of aggravating circumstances may not
capture all of the features relevant to culpability.4" 6 For instance, an offender who
murders his wife in front of their children would not be eligible for death in many
states despite the killing's extreme brutality and the breach of the familial obligations
to spouse and children.40 7 Alternatively, the number and breadth of aggravating
circumstances may be so encompassing that it singles out those who merit death no
better than the Georgia murder statute in Furman,which made all murders eligible
for death.408 However, even though the Court has given states virtually complete
freedom respecting the content and number of aggravating circumstances, their specification nonetheless does tend to promote proportionality.
It is in the context of this prophylactic approach that a categorical constitutional
ban against the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds becomes justifiable. A
categorical ban will exclude a few offenders who reasonably may be classed among
the "worst of the worst." But the overwhelming bulk of juvenile offenders may not
' 9 greater
be so classed due to their "'lack of maturity, "'4
"susceptib[ility] to ... peer
4
'
1
pressure," and "personality traits [that] are more transitory."'"' In light of the wellknown inadequacies surrounding the implementation of the death penalty generally
as well as the difficulty of distinguishing between "transient [juvenile] immaturity"'"2
and "irreparable corruption,"'"3 a complete ban can be justified as a prophylactic
measure. Like the aggravating circumstance requirement, it can be seen to make an imperfect but necessary contribution to proportionality. The Roper Court implicitly appealed to the need for prophylactic rules, speaking of the unacceptable "risk [of]
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpa14
bility.'
A virtue of the approach to cruel and unusual punishment proposed here is that
it focuses firstly and more directly on the relevant constitutional considerations. The
issue is whether death may constitute a proportionate punishment for murderers who
are sixteen or seventeen when they commit their offense. As the difference between
Howe, supra note 113, at 815.
407 Death penalty statutes do not treat the breach of familial obligations as an aggravating
406

circumstance, and many make only premeditated killings eligible for death. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (2003); 18 PA. CONG. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (2004); 42 PA. CONG. STAT.

ANN. § 9711 (d) (2004).
408 Howe, supra note 113, at 815-17.

Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 367 (1993)).
409

410
411

Id.
Id.

412

Id. at 1197.

413

Id.

414

Id. (emphasis added).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:475

the Court and Justice O'Connor nicely illustrates, the answer turns on the approach
used to implement proportionality. Is the required proportionality best achieved
through the kind of case-by-case analysis employed in Justice O'Connor's Roper
opinion and the Court's cases respecting other punishments? Through some matrix
of prophylactic rules, as the Court's opinion implicitly presumes? Through some
combination of case-by-case review and prophylactic rules? What should the prophylactic rules be? Specification of aggravating circumstances, with consideration
of any relevant mitigating circumstances? Comparative proportionality review in
which appellate courts compare cases, seeking to assure that death is imposed only
in the worst cases? It is answers to questions such as these that provide the overall
framework within which the issue in Roper must be decided. Unfortunately, the
Court has devoted more attention to creativejurisdiction counts than to the thoughtful
construction of an overall framework for implementing proportionality.
CONCLUSION

In moments of candor, the Justices have confessed that the Court's Eighth
Amendment case law suffers from "a lack of clarity"4 15 and "incompatible sets of
commands. 4 16 They are right. The Court's decisions do suffer from confusion and
inconsistency concerning such fundamental matters as the text, its own role, the
relevance of customary penal practice, and the constitutional status of proportionality. It is time that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence evolve in the direction of greater coherence along each of these crucial dimensions.
This can be accomplished while retaining some key aspects of the Court's work.
The Court rightly has read the Eighth Amendment to condemn inhumane prison
conditions despite their pervasive nature. Distrust of the political processes is appropriate and necessary in this context. The Court's death penalty cases are rightly
concerned with proportionality, even if they are less than clear about the aim of and
alternatives to the debatable mechanisms they use to respond to that concern. More
generally, the Court has created some exemplary conceptual tools. It usefully has
defined a "cruel" punishment as one involving the gratuitous infliction of suffering,
required culpability on the part of the punisher so as to give separation of powers
and federalism concerns adequate play, and located human dignity at the heart of the
Eighth Amendment.
Other core features of the Court's jurisprudence stand in tension with these
principles and require rejection. By effectively restricting proportionality to the
death penalty context, the Court has defied notions ofjust punishment shared by the
founding and modem worlds alike. In addition, the Court's repeated declaration that
415
416

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
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"the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory"'4 17
must be abandoned despite its appealing ring. If punishments may be justified
solely on the basis of the utilitarian objectives of deterrence and incapacitation, then
no judicially enforceable constraints exist and even torture and the rack become
legitimate punishments. Finally, the Court's statements about the role of customary
penal practice are too broad and undiscriminating. Even the Court does not follow
them, as its prison conditions cases reveal. In place of a selectively observed rhetoric
of deference, the political dynamics of crime warrant skepticism sensitive to the
problems of excessive generality, inadequate funding, desuetude, and unrestrained
pursuit of deterrence and incapacitation.
In addition to preserving the valuable and rejecting the dysfunctional aspects of
the Court's jurisprudence, the vision sketched out here harmonizes important constitutional and moral values. By putting the concept of cruelty center stage, it coheres
with the Founders' evident understanding that the phrases "cruel and unusual," "cruel
or unusual," and "cruel" punishments interchangeably refer to a unitary concept. It
also accords with the widely shared and persisting moral judgment that cruel
punishments are unjust even and sometimes especially when .regularly employed. In
insisting that punishment find its justification in retributive precepts ofjustice, it gives
expression to the notion that individuals possess a basic dignity that precludes government from using them as mere pawns in grand schemes of social engineering. This
notion not only serves as the arguable premise of individual rights generally but also
conforms with mainstream currents of subconstitutional sentencing theory such as the
new Model Penal Code's philosophy of limiting retributivism. It also traces back to
the Founding, as do this proposal's other building blocks, and so allows our understanding ofthe Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to evolve in a way that maintains
contact with its deepest roots..

417 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) (quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).

